The Ionian Sea


   Operations at the mouth of the Adriatic, in late August of 1900, never became a headline event in the newspapers and, as a result, it was never labeled with a name such as the Battle of the Yellow Sea. One can easily surmise that the area was already important and highly contested before the Balkan situation made it a primary theater. Austria-Hungary had already found itself in something of a crisis when Italy joined the war and threatened to cut off the Adriatic shipping. Not only did this increase the tempo of naval operations but, several formerly unimportant area’s suddenly became critical and Austrian and German troops marched into, and occupied, neutral Montenegro.
There were no major stand up fights between major fleets in the Ionian Sea. Newspapers usually make their money by printing exceptions and, in 1900, such a battle would have been just that. That is still unfair not to call the Ionian operations anything but a battle. It was simply overlooked by the press because, for the time, it was not what people thought of as noteworthy. Ironically, the operations in the area would be a forerunner for what would be major naval operations in the future. Still, how can you not call it a battle since the capital ships of six nations were deployed to the area and ultimately involved in the fighting. The only real difference between the Yellow and Ionian seas were that, in the latter, they simply clashed in a piecemeal fashion and not all at once.
Historians still argue over which operations began and ended this particular “battle.” I tend to group the operations of the last three weeks of August as what constitutes the bulk of important moves that were taken in the Ionian Sea. These are the operations that were specifically in support of both sides attempts to occupy Albania. I have thought that the natural starting point was the redeployment of French Admiral Ernest Fournier’s main task force in early August. This included two of France’s primary battleships of the Charles Martel class that were considered so important that, when they were built, they prompted debate in the English Parliament.
Unfortunately for France, by 1900, most of their capital ships were well past their prime and not considered overly effective against the Royal Sovereigns of Great Britain. The introduction of the CSS Texas would render most of the France’s major warships, if not every battleship on the planet, obsolete. Still, in August of that year, they were powerful enough for what France required and that was particularly true when you consider that they were working in conjunction with the Italian Navy.
Many jokes have been made about Italy and, in particular, her navy. While this might be the usual fodder of coffee shops and armchair admirals the fact is that war room planners did not have the luxury of writing the Italians off. This was very true in 1900 when Italy was in possession of one of the newest and most modern fleets in existence. Compared to that of the Royal Navy it was very small but, on a ship to ship basis, the Italian vessels were clearly superior to anything the British could send against them. As with France, Italy had her share of modern cruisers that were built for the same purposes. In the realm of capital vessels, Italy also had two vessels that had concerned the British for some time, those being the battleships Caio Dullio and Enrico Dandolo. Their appearance in the late seventies had even prompted the British to copy their designs with the building of the HMS Inflexible.
Interesting to note that Inflexible had been originally commanded by one of the architects of this battle, Jackie Fisher. It is even more important to note that while both Italian ships were not only still in active service at the time but, were also the core of the Regia Maria. At the same time, Inflexible had already been relegated to the reserve fleet and guard duty at Portsmouth. Even so, both Dullio and Dandolo had been upgraded several times since their first trials and, ironically, many of their improvements came directly from Britain. Their limitations had yet to be truly discovered until the Ionian Sea. In August of 1900 they were still of serious concern to the British Royal Navy.
Franco-Italian operations, also, had one serious advantage over allied efforts. It was an advantage that was as simple as geography. Entente forces were primarily operating out of the Italian base at Taranto and were very close to their ultimate objective, Albania. Allied forces had several bases in the area including both Malta and the Austrian bases in the Adriatic but, the bulk of their forces had to operate out of Alexandria in Egypt. This advantage might have assured the Entente a victory had Tirpitz not turned their ultimate trump card into a liability by introducing what would come to dominate naval operations for a century.
It was not long after the first French ships dropped anchor in the well defended harbor of Taranto that they discovered their defenses had suddenly been completely negated by Germany’s new wonder weapons. Smaller Austrian airships had already been over flying Taranto for weeks, watching for the inevitable arrival of French warships. For this reason the Italian defenses paid little mind when the first German airships appeared over the port. Entente intelligence was well aware that the German air fleet had redeployed. They had simply dismissed it as unimportant since the raids in France had proven to be largely ineffectual. They would soon change their minds.
The German air fleet never did any crippling damage with any one raid on Taranto. The first attack managed to set a few buildings on fire and none of them were critical. The damage they did to the actual port facilities, at the water line, was minimal and easily repaired. The Germans were far from mastering any accurate means of delivering their payloads. In order to compensate for this problem, what the German’s did do was increase the size of their ordinance. This method met with mixed results and quite possibly cost them the most critical hit that they scored in the first raid on Taranto.
LZ-36 not only managed to land a hit on the French battleship Charles Martel but, she hit the Martel with one of the large “Marineshiffkampf,” or quite literally, ship killers. It was a rather fat looking, fin stabilized, bomb that was carried nose down inside the actual rigid frame of the newer class of Zeppelins. It had been specifically built to bomb Taranto. Had the bomb detonated as planned it would have most likely blown Martel right out of the water. Fortunately for the French, ships of the time were not armored against air attacks and the bomb crashed effortlessly thru the weather deck, above the forecastle, and continued through the vessel until it punched a hole in her bottom. The bomb buried itself in the mud, bellow the harbor, and would harmlessly detonate two days later.
Still, the Germans had made their point and their victory was more than cosmetic. The damage to Martel was repairable but, she was not going to participate in the actions of August 1900. Unfortunately for the German’s, their early success prompted an immediate reaction from the French. Ever since the Paris raid, the French military had quickly began looking for a counter to the Zeppelin’s and their first stop gap measure showed some signs of success. What the French lacked for their new anti aircraft guns, which were basically converted seventy-five millimeter, rapid fire, artillery pieces with new sights and an under carriage that allowed for maximum elevation, was an adequate field test. The Germans had stopped nearly all bombing in France (because of the redeployment to the Austrian coast) at about the same time the French deployed the first of their new guns. Now the French had a place to send their guns and, they would make Zeppelin operations expensive over Taranto and, more important, greatly reduce the effects of the bombing. The Martel was the first and last ship to be hit in Taranto.
Fortunately for the allies, the bombing was never meant to be anything more than simple harassment and, in that much, it was an unqualified success. It forced the Entente to change many things about their operations and it made their safe haven feel like anything but. Tirpitz also had a secondary objective in mind when it came to his flying trains. The bombing was something of a diversion and this worked even better than the harassment objective. It was meant to deceive the French and Italian navies as to the real purpose of the Zeppelins. They had a far more powerful weapon than their bombs. The most important weapon they now carried were their British “Lightening Detector” crews.
Just like with the tests done by HMS Mercury, Admiral Fournier never seemed to have guessed what was going on with the Zeppelins. When you read the reports of both the French Navy and the Regia Marina it is quite obvious that they understood the Zeppelins were scouting for the allied fleet. What they most definitely never caught on too was how fast this information was reaching the various allied task forces operating in the area. The practical effect of these radio reports was that it completely negated the geographical advantage held by the Entente. It eliminated the need for time and fuel consuming patrols and gave the Royal Navy and her allies the ability to concentrate power in critical area’s while the Entente forces had to remain spread out. This would translate into several victories for the allies and it appeared, to Fournier, to be nothing more than bad luck on his part.
Fournier also felt that as long as his capital ships were operating in the area then the allies could not risk large troop movements from Egypt because they could not adequately protect the transports. This was very conventional thinking and he never realized he was fighting very unconventional forces at this point. Any amphibious operations to secure Albanian ports would leave the allied fleet vulnerable and he was simply waiting for his chance to strike with his real power. Again, Fournier seems to have been clueless as to the capabilities that this new technology was offering the allies.
The basic assumption that the Royal Navy would be exposed while protecting amphibious operations was fundamentally correct, however, Fournier was quite blind as to what was going on. This was, again, made so by the presence of the enemy air cover which hampered reconnaissance efforts by Entente warships. The Italians had managed to lay mines in the harbor of Durazzo which, would have made even an unopposed landing hazardous and time consuming. This would have truly made the allied fleet vulnerable as they would have to sit at anchor, outside the harbor, and protect the effort to clear the mines. This combined with the fact that Albania offered very few places, along it’s coast, to safely land troops, would have made for ideal conditions for the Entente’s fleet to strike and cause serious damage. Fortunately for Tirpitz, this was never required.
As Fournier waited for his opportunity he was unaware that allied troops were already in Albania and had long since seized the port of Durazzo along with several others. This would seem almost logical since Austrian occupied Montenegro which shared a border with Albania, however, the mountains and poor conditions of the roads made large scale operations of this type nearly impossible. Again this was only if you considered the conventional capabilities of the time and the allies were now able to get around these problems. The first allied troops to land in Durazzo did not come from the sea. They were special German infantry companies that roped in via their transports, three Zeppelin’s that were modified specifically for this purpose. These troops were followed by British Engineers along with Austrian Naval personnel. The port was quickly secured and several vessels that were sitting, idle in Durazzo’s port, were quickly pressed into service as makeshift mine sweepers. When the first of Kitchener’s troops arrived, via naval transports, from Egypt, the port was already serviceable and no amphibious operations were even required.
These airborne operations were so successful that Admiral Fournier would not even be aware that they took place until after the war. When his capital ships would sortie to intercept the large convoy from Egypt, Fournier sailed for Durazzo and his plan was to sit and wait for the Royal Navy to deploy for amphibious operations. The Entente task force would never reach their objective and this had nothing to do with the protection for the convoy. Fournier’s movements were immediately detected and reported by the Zeppelin’s and Tirpitz then played his trump card.
Some weeks earlier, at the conclusion of the Confederate Operation Grand Tour, the task force centered on the CSS Texas, dropped anchor in the harbor of Santiago De Cuba. The Spanish squadron, normally stationed here, was preparing to leave once the city was officially handed over to the Confederate States. The Spanish did as they had always planned only, when they set sail for Europe, most of the Confederate task force left with them. The deception seems to have worked and this is never more clear than when you read US Naval Intelligence reports. They did notice that the Confederate warships were gone but, never realized that the Texas and her escorts were sailing towards the Mediterranean with the Spanish. Task Force Alamo would not show up again, on Entente maps, until it was encountered by Fournier in the Ionian Sea.
The engagement was far smaller than the battle of the Yellow Sea but, this battle would be far more important. The design of the Texas, supported by her modern cruiser force, would conclusively prove it’s worth. As Confederate Admiral Brooke would later note, “when them Italian ships were hit, they stayed hit.” Of course, this particular aspect had less to do with the Texas and more to do with the fact that the Italian Navy had yet to pick up the damage control habits that had proven their worth at the battle of the Yellow Sea and were now being rapidly adopted by every other navy in the world. What can be attributed to the CSS Texas was not even her superior armament or protection but, the fact that she hit her targets far more than her opposition. Texas was very outnumbered in her slugfest but, she had the advantage of firing over the horizon, well out of range of most of the Entente’s guns. The targeting information was also being observed by her German air cover and relayed, via the radio sets. This allowed Texas to stay out of range of most of the guns that could really hurt her.
Also, Texas did not seek to force an outright battle and, at first, Fournier was more than happy to oblige. It was only after the Caio Dullio was severely damaged that he felt obliged to try and force an all out engagement with the Confederate task force. His attempts too run them off were only playing into the hands of the Confederate’s since their primary objective was delay. When Task Force Alamo engaged they had never thought the battle would be so conclusive. What the Confederates did know was that, slowly, the primary ships of the French and Italian navies were having to sail south and east, away from the British task force that was transporting Kitchener’s army.
The Zeppelin’s were not just scouting either. They never managed to land a single hit on an Entente ship but, they did force the French vessels to break their formations and make time consuming maneuvers in order to avoid being lined up in a German bomb sight. This rendered much of their return fire, at the CSS Texas, ineffective. By the time that Fournier signaled his ships to break off and return to Taranto, the Texas had managed to hit every single capital ship in the Entente task force.
The older French Ironclad Trident was severely damaged and lagged behind the task force allowing her to be finished off by Confederate cruisers. The Magneta managed to make it back to port but, would never leave Taranto. She was taking on too much water and, three days after dropping anchor a partial collapse of a bulkhead would cause sever flooding. She would have completely capsized had she not been in the shallow harbor. Even the Brennus, which was serving as Fournier’s flagship, was threatened with complete destruction by fire. Her crew was eventually able to get it under control but, Brennus would still be out of service for over a year.
This was not just a blow to operations in the Ionian Sea. This would have serious ramifications too operations in the Mediterranean in general and the ever crucial Western Med in particular. It was also not over with as Fournier retreated to base. The Zeppelin’s would harass his fleet all the way back and, even the airships that had expended their ordinance, would cause great concern since the sailors below had no idea this was the case. It also served to keep the Entente eyes looking up when they had no idea that most serious of threats was coming from an entirely different direction. The Zeppelins were also herding the Entente task force right into the trap.
The Confederates had also brought more than the CSS Texas to the battle. Waiting just past the minefields, that protected the approaches to port of Taranto, were seven of the newest vessels of the Confederate Navy. The Zeppelins had already seen the channels used by the French and Italians and now they were guarded by something more lethal than mines. Seven Confederate submarines had been deployed by cruisers in the days leading up to the battle. The Cruisers had delivered these boats at night, well beyond the picket ships that guarded the harbor. The subs were of a newer design and had better range and power than the prototypes used in the Chesapeake. They anchored themselves and laid in wait for the first targets that were worth exposing their position for.
Three of the submarines would not return yet there is no record that the Italian Navy discovered or sunk them. Their fate remains a mystery to this day. None of the Confederate submarines saw Fournier’s task force leave but, the return of the Entente fleet was another story. The Entente ships were hard to miss since several were leaving behind a smoke trail and Zeppelins were hovering around them like a pack of flies. One submarine, the CSS Fin, got lucky and was able to maneuver within range of her two torpedoes.
The Enrico Dandolo had, so far, escaped any serious damage and was probably the most effective capital ship left in Fournier’s task force. She had actually managed to fight off a serious effort by the Confederate Cruisers to scatter the task force’s screening vessels so that the CS torpedo flotilla could make a run at the French battleships. The Texas never had time to seriously concentrate on Dandolo since the Italian ship never made any real attempt to engage. Unfortunately for Dandolo, this put her at the lead of the Entente retreat and she would blunder right into the path of the CSS Fin. Both Torpedo’s hit their mark and Dandolo rolled over, broke in half, and went down with most of her crew. This defeat, added to the near crippling damage that was already done to the Caio Dullio would, in effect, take the Italian Navy right out of the war.
The effects of this battle would change the scoreboard in the Ionian Sea. Kitchener’s troops would land even if they would not immediately become a threat to the Russo-Serbian Army in Macedonia. The weather and mountains would hamper Kitchener’s attempts to link up with Roberts. In fact, the German attempt to supply Kitchener by Zeppelin’s would cost them more airships than all of the combat operations combined. Despite this setback, the effects of the allied victory cannot be understated.
The most important of these effects was that Greece elected to remain neutral. As much as the Greeks wished to resume hostilities with the Turks, they now found themselves almost completely surrounded by allied forces and the reputation of both Kitchener, along with those of the Zeppelins, was enough to cause the hawk faction inside of Greece to back down. The other effect was, in the long run, probably more important even if it did not seem so at the time. The attempt by the Entente to link up in the Balkans had now been effectively squashed. Not only did they lack the ports to do this but, their naval strength was no longer up to the task. In essence, the French Army had just been taken out of the war and the last chance they had to bring their firepower to bear was lost. The French troops in Italy would have to stay there and could no longer threaten either the Balkans or Egypt.