By Other Means


   In the book that is often considered the final arbiter on military matters, On War, by Carl Von Clausewitz, he is often quoted that war is an extenuation of  politics by other means. Many of his students, men who knew him personally, were still on the battlefield and in the war rooms during this conflict. One has to speculate if they still believed him. As the war was closing in on it’s second anniversary, was it still a continuation of politics? Had it ever really been? Many of the tensions and hot spots that were responsible for the war had long since been made irrelevant at this point while new issues had risen to take their place.
It would be a far more recent English historian who pointed out the basic fallacy in Clausewitz’s theory. Politics, religion, and war are seemingly inseparable but, they are also, not cause and effect. The reason they seem so intertwined is because they are all effects of something larger. They are all expressions of culture. If this is the case then it is easy to see why no one had bothered to attempt to negotiate a cease fire at this point. Did the politicians and generals really believe that there was anything to gain by continuing the fighting? It does not seem to be the case. What does seem to be true is that if the war was an extenuation of politics then, the politics were an extenuation of pride, by other means.
This was never more clearly demonstrated than in the United States. This is not to suggest that it was unique to America, only more visible. The year of 1900 was more than just the last year of the 19th century. It was more than just another year of the war. It also happened to be an election year in a working democracy. Elihu Root was standing for reelection and it was very clear that the ballot box was quickly becoming a referendum on the war itself. Here we have a clear cut case of the exact opposite of the conventional wisdom. Here we have politics being the extenuation of the war and not vice versa, as Clausewitz would have us believe.
Root’s dilemma was becoming very similar to that of the first Lincoln Administration. His popularity was entirely dependent on the performance of his military. Root was also discovering that spinning stories could only get you so far and that was particularly true when the single largest newspaper magnate in the country was hinting at his own candidacy. William Randolph Hearst was also holding a potential presidential bid over Root’s head like it was a sword of Damocles.
This is not to say that anyone gave Hearst a realistic chance of winning. Even Hearst himself was pessimistic about his chances and this could explain why he did not actually toss his hat in the ring. For Hearst, his chances of moving in the executive mansion was irrelevant. What Hearst did have the power to do was cost Elihu Root the election and it was a fact that did not require Hearst to actively seek the office. One has to also consider that Hearst was, more than likely, not trying to throw the election for Root but, court political currency instead. The reason seems simple enough in that Hearst was even less enthusiastic about Root’s chief rival winning than was Root.
There were several men running for president in 1900 but, from late spring to early summer, the numbers were shaping up and it had become clear that only one man was a serious rival to replace Root. This man was named Eugene Debbs and his campaigning was based almost entirely on one thing. Debbs was promising, as his very first act as commander chief, to declare a cease fire with the allied powers and end the war. People had the perception of a very clear cut choice in the matter between Debbs and Root, even if the reality of the situation was entirely different.
It seems rather unlikely that Debbs could have ever followed thru on his only real campaign promise. Despite appearances, the majority of US Presidents have simply lacked the power to rule by edict and this was exactly what Debbs was proposing. Congress would have never gone along with it and neither would have a sizable majority of the population, both of whom were very hard to ignore. There was also the little problem with the enemies of the US who, were also, unlikely to have been receptive to such a proposal. If they chose to fight on then anything that Debbs wanted was rendered moot since, at that point, the US could only continue fighting or surrender.
This is all reasoning with the clarity of hindsight. In 1900, too many, Debbs peace campaign seemed like anything but the pipe dream that it truly was. There was great dissension in the US and all of it revolved around the war but, not so much centered on the question of ending it. Most people were angered at it’s prosecution and here is where Hearst found his strongest allies. They were not strong enough to unseat Root but, they were enough to split the vote and put Debbs in the executive mansion. It was causing serious turmoil inside the Root administration and many, including John Hay, were already making plans for how to carry on once they were handed their hat.
These concerns were only minor in comparison to the tremors being felt at The Sedan and in St Petersburg. President Boulanger might have been an autocratic dictator but, at least he did have enough of a background to understand how democracies worked. He should have known better but, Boulanger did not trust democracy and his current position should have been more than enough evidence of that. At the same time, Czar Nicholas not only mistrusted democracy but, he did not even grasp the subtle complexities that came with such a form of government. That is easy to surmise since it is clear that Nicholas barely understood his own government.
What did seem clear to the American partners in the Triple Entente, even if it was not really true, was that the US was wavering in her commitments. They both howled about Debbs and demanded that Root take action. Both Boulanger and Nicholas were less than subtle in suggesting that the American President declare a state of emergency and suspend the election until after the war. The autocrats saw this as reasonable while the American public was outraged. British and Confederate propaganda made sure they were reminded of this at every instance. Root’s chances for reelection sunk even lower and, where a skillful politician might have seen this as an opportunity to ring more out of his allies, too Root, all of this was an affront to his honor and he sank even deeper into depression. This hurt his chances even more and it became a vicious cycle that was feeding on itself.
The real coup de grace came on the heels of the sinking of the Belfort Star. It is with great irony that this particular thing would cause so much outrage since, militarily speaking, it was a minor affair at best and insignificant in the grand scheme of things. The loosing of just over eight hundred lives was, in comparison to the losses at the front, not even a metaphorical drop in the bucket. Still, this was an election year and the Belfort Star made good copy because of the elements of the story.
Belfort had gone down with all hands and in an instant. This kind of thing is not just death but a frightening one. There was no warning or defense. One minute everything was fine and the next there was oblivion. It is a frightening prospect to any sane person. Also, most of the men on her were not really men, at least, they were not when you looked through the prism of William Randolph Hearst. These were all just young boys who were fresh from training and had yet to see war. Deep in the subconscious of most people (helped by a famous sketch of their tender young faces, courtesy of Fredrick Remington) this felt like innocence. Last, they never reached the front. So, in one sinking you had horror, the squashing of innocence, and waste all rolled into one neat package that Hearst quickly recognized.
The irony of this situation is that no one in the United States, at that time, even knew what had really sank the Belfort Star. There were no surviving witnesses from the vessel itself but, the shore batteries that covered her route and the escorting gunboat, which was trailing about a mile behind her, did. Their descriptions of the explosions led the army to conclude that it had been a mine placed in her path. Their official report, turned over to congress almost a year after the incident, would say as much.
The loss of the Belfort might not have had the impact, that it did, had it not come on the heels of what was universally being called, in the US anyway, the Roswell Incident. Where Belfort spread horror, Roswell was fanning the flames of fear. An American city had been seized and occupied by an enemy force that had done so with great ease. After this, Jesse James had become a house hold name in the United States where he was even better known than in the Confederacy. Greatly exaggerated tales of the occupation of Roswell only served to fan the flames.
Roswell could have possibly been a boon for Root had it not been for the fact that, just west of the city, where Pershing’s forces were opposing those of the Confederate and Mexican armies, the US was in what was seemingly a headlong retreat. This looked very bad to the average reader of the morning paper but, as history would prove, it was most definitely a case of explaining military realities to those who were not on the spot. The apparent collapse of the front was also a deliberate bit of misinformation. This was mostly the responsibility of three men, all of whom had conspired to do so.
Fortunately, for those three men, this was not the main battle that concerned Root the most. His job was to get reelected and the prognosis of this campaign, being waged with as much aggression and viciousness as any military action, was even worse than that of the New Mexican Front. It was just when Root thought that things could not get worse that they actually did. The Belfort Star claimed her final casualty and it was none other than Root’s own Vice President, Philander Knox.
Knox was not an insider in the Root administration. He was a constant source of embarrassment and one that Root never lifted a finger to help. In fact, whenever Knox caused a scandal, or said the wrong thing, it is clear that Root and Hay let these stories play out in the press by fading into the shadows and not utter a single word. One might think that this was foolishness on the part of Root but, in fact, it would seem this was exactly the Vice President’s real job, even if he was unaware.
To put it bluntly, and this is a bit of speculation, it would seem that Root only kept Knox around so that he would have a fall guy when he needed one. From all we know of Knox, he was a competent administrator, a thoughtful man, and somewhat sincere in his dealings with others (at least for a politician). It is hard to show these qualities when someone else is constantly setting you up and, while there is no direct proof of this, it would seem to be the case here. It is the only thing that can explain the actions, of the Vice President, following the Belfort Star.
When it became clear that a head was required to roll for the Belfort Star, in the middle of a hotly contested presidential campaign, from out of nowhere the Vice President resigned. The letter that Knox presented to Root did nothing to truly explain the reasons for his resignation. He vaguely hinted at health reasons but, his subsequent life would dispel this notion even if it was the most commonly excepted at the time. What had really happened was that Knox had been sacrificed to the altar of public opinion and, ultimately, not just for the Belfort but rather, the entire war so far.
While this served to relieve some of the pressure that had been pushing down on Root, it created an entirely new problem that he and, more specifically John Hay, had not counted on. They had already hand picked two possible successors for Knox. Their first choice was a man named Thomas Platt, who was a party power broker from the New York Republican Machine and had been instrumental in negotiating the unofficial agreements between the United States and Boulanger Regime. They would have preferred Platt but, saw many complications in getting him accepted by both the Congress and the public at large.
The second man was a curious choice because he was not a Republican and had been a long running thorn in the side of Root . Still, as Hay reasoned, the choice of the Governor of New York, Grover Cleveland, seemed logical and the benefits outweighed the liabilities. Cleveland had a reputation as a reformer and was mildly popular with the public. He was not exactly a supporter of the war but, at the same time, he was also not a an outspoken critic. The votes and influence he could bring to Roots reelection bid could be what was required to finally put Debbs in his place. It would also go greatly towards silencing Hearst.
There were also other important factors besides appearing to form a coalition government. Both Root and Hay also wrote that they viewed Cleveland’s chances of ever successfully running for the presidency as less than realistic. When you considered the additional benefit of removing Cleveland from his long time governorship and then putting him in a position where he could be controlled, it made the man the perfect choice to replace Knox. Unfortunately for Root, Congress disagreed and, to an extent, so did Cleveland who never truly accepted the offer to begin with.
On Capitol Hill, the cronies of William Jennings Bryan and his populists were not interested in replacing Knox with anyone. With Knox out of the way, the speaker of the house was next in line to become president. While no one even considered the possibility that Root would meet an untimely demise, just holding that particular key gave both the House of Representatives, and the populists (aka former President Bryan) a very big negotiating chip that they could bring to the table when they needed it. As a result, the legislatures did everything they could to block the nomination of anyone, to the position, while appearing to only be interested in doing the very thing that they were trying to avoid.
This only served to make Root look indecisive and drove his campaign even further into the mud. It looked as if Debbs was going to win the election in November and move in to the executive mansion in January of 1901. Then, just as it seemed that things could not get any worse, they did. The latest blow did not come from the political squabbling within the United States. It did not even come from North America. This came from Europe and suddenly grabbed the headlines so thoroughly that even the election took a back seat.