The West Wing


   At the least, one might label Theodore Roosevelt as an unqualified hawk. That was most certainly true of the young Theodore who had yet to ever see battle. Some have gone so far as to say that he was bloodthirsty but, that seems a bit unfair. Many point to the day that Mexico entered the war and Roosevelt’s reaction to it. There is no denial that he was enthused by the fact that his front was now active but, does that really denote an absolute thirst for blood? Roosevelt was far from the only man who greeted the news with enthusiasm.
One has to qualify the conditions that these men found themselves saddled with in the southwestern United States. Up till their front became active, the most pressing issue faced by officers and non-com’s alike was a string of absence without leaves. Most of the troops that were stationed on this front were posted within fifty miles of their own homes and the idea of going back to see the wife, sleeping in ones own bed, and a home cooked meal was generally enough to eventually temp even the most stalwart soldier. The area also saw a sudden boom in the pool hall and saloon businesses. A lot of that was centered around the town of Tombstone. A good deal of the men who were not showing up for morning formations were usually too drunk to do so. It was a minor problem but an extremely annoying one for men like Roosevelt.
Needless to say, all of this was indicative of serious morale problems for the US Army. Roosevelt was a very studious individual and in many ways, he shared the exact same concerns as his men. He wrote of these problems and his, sometimes, ingenious solutions. This included leading a forced march of one of his troops to a Tombstone saloon where he paid for the libations out of his own pocket. It gave the men what they wanted and gave Roosevelt control of the situation. Still, as Roosevelt noted in his writings, it was not what the men really wanted and he so aptly noted in his journal, “only the sounds of battle will rectify this most unfortunate situation.”
It was not as much a want of bloodlust as it might sound. Roosevelt went on to note that it was more a sense of purpose. The generation that Roosevelt grew up in was saturated with the idea that the events of North America had gone horribly wrong and that the very spirit of America had been betrayed by their southern brethren. If the average Confederate citizen had become comfortable with the idea of being citizens of a separate country, many in the United States had not.
Naturally, Roosevelt’s generation assumed the mantle that it was their job, if not outright crusade, to fix what was broken. Roosevelt was particularly fixated with this idea and not because of any lofty rhetoric. For him it was far more personal. His father had been of military age during the American 61 and, since the family was fairly wealthy, the elder Roosevelt had bought his way out of the war. Roosevelt had never made any secret of the fact that he felt an obligation to make up for his father’s sins.
If that was not enough for Roosevelt there were other facts that, most likely, weighed heavily on his mind. No one had ever accused Roosevelt, or his family, of being Confederate sympathizers but, there is some evidence that Roosevelt believed people whispered such notions about him. After all, Roosevelt’s mother was from Georgia. Both she and his Grandmother had thought the secessionist movement was “madness” and relocated to New York just before Georgia left the US. Even so, a good deal of the Bulloch clan did not and most of them not only stayed but supported their home state, with distinction, during the last war. Most notable of those was the current CS Secretary of the Navy, James Bulloch.
Roosevelt was also very typical of the generation for a host of other reasons. Before the war, his life had been that of what could only be described as a drifter. A lot of this can be easily pinned on his restless personality and the fact that he could afford to be a drifter but, he was not alone in his wanderings. Personal tragedies, and Roosevelt had known his share, were quite often amplified by the state of world affairs. It is human nature to want for blame and the CSA had become quite a popular distraction from such things.
Such traits could easily be described as harboring a desire for revenge and there is little doubt that this played into the attitudes of the common US citizen of the day. That was not the entire picture and, in particular, with the men doing military service in the state of New Mexico. A soldier’s life, especially in garrison, is one of tedium and bland routine. The work is often mind numbing and the one thing that can offset a soldiers woes is a sense of purpose. Once the US and Mexico were at war there was a notable difference in the attitudes of the soldiers serving along the border. Unfortunately for them, it would take some time before they got their wish to do something. Once again, it would be Roosevelt’s pen that was at the heart of this.
Not only had Roosevelt and Wood been agitating their commanders for the opportunity to act but, so had most of the mid level officers in the department. While a great deal of blame is placed on the Departmental commanders who preceded Pershing this is really unfair. For starters, they had no orders to take any offensive actions. While militaries generally reward aggressive behavior, in this case, it was actually sensible given the situation.
Northwestern Mexico was largely neutralized as a threat to the United States by the actions of Pancho Villa. While Maximilian’s forces did control most of the towns and villages, in Chihuahua and Sonora, Villa’s men made re-supply of those garrisons difficult on the best of days. The terrain itself did not lend itself to supporting large scale military operations anyway. These factors combined to make for what was probably one of the most quietest fronts of the war.
The other reason, for the lack of US activity, was not south of the border but, in New Mexico. The department was starved for supplies. Active US offensives in Ontario, Alberta, and Tennessee were using up supplies at a frightening rate. They far exceeded pre-war estimates by a substantial amount and, whenever those fronts needed more material or men, they were most often stripped from New Mexico. When Pershing took command, in Santa Fe, he might have been shocked and horrified by the state of his logistics had it not been for the fact that he was already well aware of the situation.
Apparently, so was Roosevelt. His writings bare out that he was both annoyed and understood the supply issues. He even seems to have agreed but, was still angered by the lack of supplies anyway. This did not stop him though. This seems to also be true of both Pershing and Wood. While no one has ever proven it, these three men all seemed to have definitive plans once Pershing was holding the reigns. The fact that they moved so quickly indicates that they had been making preparations, for active operations, even before Pershing took command.
This is how, in the summer of 1899, Roosevelt managed to lead his regiment in an invasion of Mexico in what was the first offensive operation on his front. It was, at best, a minor affair but, you would not know this by the number of head lines it generated. As I have noted earlier, George Armstrong Custer kept a contingent of reporters who were permanently attached to his headquarters. He had nothing on Roosevelt who did not have quite as many reporters following him into battle but, who some of these men were more than made up of for the lack of quantity. Naturally, Roosevelt’s personal friend, Richard Harding Davis left Bisbee with the First US Volunteer Cavalry but, he was not the only noted name that made the journey.
Ambrose Bierce was no stranger to the battlefield. The man had served in the first war against the Confederate States, first as a private soldier, and then as an officer who received a battlefield commission after repeated acts of heroism in both West Virginia and Tennessee. Bierce had remained in the army after the war and he even rose to the rank of a Regular Army Major. While stationed in San Francisco at the Presidio, for reasons known only to Bierce, he resigned his commission and became a writer. He was successful and, by the time he was following Roosevelt, he was one of William Randolph Hearts inner circle. Bierce was one of the few men who was privy to the information that Hearst was harboring ambitions to ascend to the White House. His presence during Roosevelt’s offensive seems to be directly related to this.
This makes Bierce somewhat of an ironic figure. The man was an outspoken critic of President Root. The fact that the New York political machine, of which Root was a prominent member, considered Roosevelt an undesirable was not well known outside of the machine, however, the fact that Roosevelt was a loose cannon was.  It is not a great leap to think that Bierce tagged along on this offensive because Hearst believed that it would ultimately fail and he would have more dirt on Elihu Root, all courtesy of Roosevelt.
Hearst’s estimation of Roosevelt’s chances of success was not unrealistic and the newspaper magnate did not have the entire picture to base his calculations on. This operation was little more than a raid since the US Army did not have the logistics to support their troops in the area for very long. This may explain the choice of the target and, on the surface, the Mexican city of Cananea seems to be a bit more than Roosevelt could chew. This was only on the surface and, if Roosevelt is to be believed, the limited objectives of the operation were fulfilled.
The single largest factor in operating cavalry in the region was the availability of water. What aided the Cananea operation was the fact that Pancho Villa’s forces knew where all of the watering holes were and this allowed the small force of cavalry to concentrate and operate in the area for a temporary period of time. It seems unlikely that Pershing or Roosevelt actually believed that they could take Cananea. Pershing knew his business and fully understood that Roosevelt could not take artillery with him on this operation. The terrain would not permit it and re-supply would be impossible. Even if, by some miracle, Roosevelt could overwhelm the garrison (that had artillery) then Roosevelt would find himself isolated in the region. To put it simply, staying in Mexico was out of the question.
What made Cananea an attractive target was not just the fact that they could find the water to get them there. Cananea was sitting in the middle of a mountainous region that was rich with copper. A Confederate mining conglomerate, backed by British money, was hard at work building up the infrastructure in the region so that they could exploit this find. The war had only sped up the project as the need for copper was currently at a premium.
As Roosevelt and Villa’s troops approached the city, the local garrison pulled in it’s outposts and patrols. So did most of the local civilian populace. Once the US Cavalry deployed outposts, on high ground around the city, the rest of the regiment proceeded to destroy any infrastructure they could find. They were largely successful but, it was not what Roosevelt really wanted nor was it what the reporters had come to see. Judging by Roosevelt’s writings, it would seem that he was nervous about this and was even tempted by the idea of taking some kind of offensive action against the town proper. Fortunately for him, for such an action would have likely been a disaster, the Cananea garrison was under their own pressure to do something about these bandits.
Colonel Max Weygand had been ordered to personally lead a relief column of cavalry to reinforce the garrison and, as the Emperor put it, “raise the siege of Cananea.” It was hardly a siege as Roosevelt had no real way of shutting the city down. Weygand even noted that it was easier to reach the city than was normal. Most of Villa’s forces, normally deployed to harass military traffic on the roads, were currently all involved in the operations close to Cananea.
The arrival of the Lancers, and the subsequent attempts to disrupt the US operations, finally gave Roosevelt what he had been looking for. A patrol that was led by none other than Wyatt Earp‘s brother, Morgan, stumbled over a Lancer patrol along a dried creek bed just northeast of Cananea. Both sides were looking for a place to water their horses and they had both heard the same rumors (apparently from the exact same Apache’s who were out hunting) of a low spot in the dry river bed where water could be found. There was no water but, this did not matter since both sides were spoiling for a fight.
A skirmish broke out and neither side showed much in the way of tactical brilliance. Apparently neither side even thought to take cover and simply stood in the open shooting at each other. Both sides sent out calls for reinforcements and, once again, without any display of tactics, every patrol in the area rushed towards the sounds of the guns. It was a confused sort of fight as reinforcements came in from all sides with no logical pattern. An approaching dust cloud could easily be friend or foe.
Both Roosevelt and Weygand eventually arrived and neither commander could get a handle on the situation. It only ended when the sun went down and both sides withdrew, apparently, without any orders from their respective commanders. It is fair to say that most of the troopers involved, on both sides, were not even aware their commanders were on the field. The private soldiers simply realized there was nothing to be gained, were low on ammo, had wounded to tend too, and simply did the practical thing and retreated to their base camps.
As was quite common at the time, both sides claimed victory in the “battle of Cananea.” The fact that anyone even noticed such a small operation was largely due to Roosevelt but, you have to remember, that this “victory” was only within the confines of the war that was being waged in the media and their ultimate objective was to sell papers. Both Roosevelt and Weygand were more than aware of the real score. The Americans eventually withdrew back to New Mexico, and despite Maximilian’s bombastic statements on the matter, Weygand was well aware of the fact that his actions had nothing to do with it. The American’s had also managed to set back mining operations, in the region, for at least the rest of the war. It was not a major strategic concern for the allies but, at the least, it would not help.
All of this was minor compared to the more lasting effects of the raid. Roosevelt had managed to spin the operation, and the skirmish at Dry Gulch, into a win. The fight was very romanticized as it was portrayed as two mounted forces charging each other with sabers drawn. That was not a picture anyone had seen in this current war and Roosevelt’s reputation was only boosted in the national mindset. This would have major repercussions a year later.
Roosevelt also demonstrated something else and while it is seldom considered it seems to be a major factor in his rising stardom. While he did demonstrate a great deal of personal bravery during his raid, this came as a surprise to no one. Roosevelt’s bravery had never been questioned and, in fact, it was often thought that he had a little too much of that quality. The most important thing that he demonstrated, and it was the quality that denied Hearst his prize story, was control. Despite great temptation, and seething ambition, Roosevelt showed an unexpected pragmatism in his command decisions. He stayed on mission. While it can be effectively argued that this operation was payback for political favors, when John Pershing called on him 1900 it would not be.  When Pershing really needed Roosevelt, and called him into action, it would be because the Teddy Bear had proven himself a capable and dependable field commander. This would ultimately be what really propelled Roosevelt onto the national stage.