The Italians

   The main reason for this is because Italy was in Europe and held the ability to the tip the balance of power in the western Mediterranean. That region was not only crucial to both sides but, it was still largely up for grabs. Italy could easily decide the question and, quite possibly, even force a major sea battle that the civilian governments, of both sides, were trying to avoid.
The respective navies were, if nothing else, desirous and spoiling for another fight. Many naval officers had studied the Battle of the Yellow Sea and were confident they could correct the mistakes and produce a major victory for their side. Their political leadership was not so optimistic in their appraisal but, ultimately, it would not matter. What had been equally recognized in the war rooms around the word was that, the attempt of winning a major victory came the risk of catastrophic defeat. The simple fact was that the Admirals could not guarantee a victory with any degree of certainty and, gambling the entire war on a single throw of the dice was seen as too risky.
Despite attempts by both sides to close off the western Mediterranean, shipping was still getting through. The area was equally important to both Britain and France. Much like their plans for an African railroad, these interests intersected in this particular body of water. Britain’s all too crucial shipping lanes to the Suez, and ultimately India, required east/west travel. France was equally dependent on her commerce with her African colonies, primarily through the port of Oran, in Algeria. The French lanes ran along a north/south route from there to Marseille.
Despite having the initial advantages, France was slowly loosing the contest for control of the western Mediterranean. The Royal Navy had collected a heavy toll for the use of those waters but, despite this, they had yet to stop the traffic between the two continents. France had dealt out considerable pain on the British convoys that “ran the gauntlet” as Merchant Marines called it. This was generally considered the final leg of the journey from Sicily to Gibraltar. More British ships would go down, in that area, than anywhere else in the world.
While the Kingdom of Italy was not considered a formidable military power, and rightly so, the addition of her Navy, to anyone’s war effort, could easily tip the balance in one of the most hotly contested and crucial theaters of war. This was a fact that the Italians were only too aware of. What made this situation so dangerous, for both sides in the war, was the volatile nature of domestic Italian politics that had combined, in the prewar era, with the an overly ambitious plan for colonial expansion.
One must understand that Italian foreign policy was generated more by her domestic problems as opposed to any vague desire to rekindle the Roman Empire. Italy was a nation that was at war with itself in every way imaginable. She was internally divided in politics by radical republicans on one side and hard core monarchists on the other. She was divided geographically by a rapidly industrializing north and a primarily agricultural south that, in the past four decades, had known over population that combined with one failed harvest after another. All nations knew such problems but, in Italy the various factional leaders tended to be radical. There seemed to be little room for compromise.
In 1900, the kingdom was only four decades old and many Italians did not even consider themselves as such. Their loyalties were generally elsewhere and foreign powers, most notably France and Austria-Hungary, had taken full advantage of these divisions. The only possible unifying force on the entire peninsula was the Catholic Church. Even in the realm of religion, generally a very strong factor for unity, this proved to be far more divisive.
The Papacy was seen as a French puppet and, indeed, the French had occupied Rome up till the Franco Prussian War of 1871. The removal of those troops had set the Vatican and the new Italian Monarchy on a collision course. These issues had not been settled in 1900 and would not be so for some time to come. Still, if the problems with the French were bad, relations with Austria-Hungary were even worse.
Trieste was a city on the Adriatic sea and, one of the few good ports in that region. It was a crossroads city with a multi-ethnic population that would have been trouble enough all by itself. What made the city a sore point was that it also happened to be the only good port that the Hapsburg Monarchy, of Austria-Hungary, owned. Without it, the Austro-Hungarian Empire became a land locked nation, cut off from the world, and destined to obscurity. This was not a situation that either Franz Joseph, in Vienna, or his staunch ally, Kaiser Wilhelm, could live with.
Italy also claimed control of the city but, currently, she did not own it. It was the stubborn Italian claims that forced Franz Joseph to dabble in internal Italian politics, primarily for the security of his one and only port. The Italians resented this and, as they saw it, the only way to protect themselves from the Hapsburgs was too become a world empire. This seemed to be the only way that they thought they could achieve the power required to deal with the Austrians as equals but, as of 1900, their entire foreign policy had been a complete and unqualified disaster.
Italy found that it was not powerful enough to build a colonial empire on it’s own. It required the ascent and active aid of the larger powers, most of whom they had gone out of their way to alienate at one time or another. They had gotten swept up by the Anglo-French competition to build the trans-African railroad and this led Italy to war in 1895. At the urging of the British, based on plans to keep the French from establishing bases in Eastern Africa, Italy attempted to conquer the independent nation of Abyssinia (modern day Ethiopia). With Russian material aid, the Ethiopians soundly defeated the Italians (the same Ethiopian Army that would later force Bonchamps to give up his expedition and directly lead to the war).
The memory of this humiliating defeat was still fresh on the mind of Italians in 1900. Strangely enough, it was not a deterrent to war but, actually a key factor in making Italian entry, in the larger conflict, inevitable. This was true of both Italian leaders and the populace. The leadership, in both factions, understood that cementing a national character through military victories was essential to a modern Italy. The average Italian was a very prideful person, even by European standards of the time, and wanted the Abyssinian stain erased from the record. By 1900 there were many calls to invade Abyssinia, once more, and with the Great Powers being distracted, the time seemed right.
The only real thing preventing an African adventure was the Italian Government’s understanding of exactly what was at stake for them. So far, Italy’s choices had been dismal at best. Their African adventure, while serving their own interests, were largely made possible because they were similar to those of Britain. On the continent, their alliance with Germany was only because it kept both, Austria Hungary and France from doing any serious medaling in domestic Italian affairs. Neither of these temporary alliances were ideal for Italy and, as the Italian government correctly saw it, the only way they would ever be free to make their own choices was the course they had set. They would establish their own empire.
This was a high stakes gambit for Italy. If they chose the right side in this war then they could easily walk away with the empire they so coveted and maybe even more besides. This would go far in politically stabilizing the country and they would finally be on a firm path to real unity, something they had yet to truly accomplish. This was a popular notion with every faction of the radicalized Italian political landscape. They had to choose wisely though.
The pitfalls were just as great. If Italy wound up on the loosing side of the war then it might mean more than just military defeat. It might even mean more than just a shift in power bases amongst the host of political factions. It might even mean more than just the downfall of the government and the monarchy. A defeat in this war could easily lead to the collapse of the entire nation and open the peninsula up to foreign domination. This would result in another collection of patchwork states who were constantly at war with each other. That was all Italy had been from practically the fall of the Roman Empire till the mid 19th century and nobody wanted to see it return. Even so, it was still a very real possibility.
This was why, even though the Italians were making plans to enter the war from the very outset, they were waiting to see who would come out ahead before committing to a side. In March of 1900, it was still not very clear who that would be. Unfortunately, Italy found out what all of the other belligerents already had. Sometimes, these things go beyond the control of nations. Italy would be swept up in the war by factors that they had never considered. Kitcheners invasion of Mozambique had set off a chain of events that would blindside Italy and take away her choices once again.