Conflicts Needs Conflicting

By that fateful summer of 1901, the lack of war material in Canada was starting to show itself in such a way that it was now impossible to hide. Governor General Minto had been aware that this situation was coming for some time. The quantity of munitions making it past the blockade of the St Lawrence Seaway had been steadily diminishing as the war went on. London’s unwillingness to attempt to lift the blockade, coupled with the increasing demands of munitions for the BCEF in Serbia was taking it’s toll. The loss of Vancouver had only compounded the situation and, too make matters worse, the only thing holding back what seemed to be an endless stream of US soldiers was, an equally endless quantity of artillery shells. That is perhaps why Canada began running dry of this particular ammunition first.

The first thing that alerted the United States to their enemy’s shortage was the rapidly diminishing number of counter attacks they were encountering along the front. It was almost standard practice at, this point in the war, considered automatic by company commanders everywhere, to expect a counter attack anytime you took a patch of ground. This was particularly true on the Canadian front where allied forces excelled in making the Entente pay for every inch they advanced. By early June, at the peak of the US offensive, the Canadian counter attacks were suddenly very rare.

Something else that was noticed by US Army troops was the clock work regularity of harassment fire from enemy artillery. At the start of the war such fire was tossed about with almost no discretion at all but, in that summer, some company commanders began counting the number of incoming artillery rounds and quickly discovered that the number, every day, was always exactly the same. When you put these two observations together, it could mean only one thing. The enemy was rationing his artillery.

Minto was aware that his enemy was aware when US attacks aimed at Montreal and Quebec City began to grow more bold. Fortunately for him, a good section of this line was being held by British soldiers, a good number of whom were pre-war regulars. They got more of the artillery ration than anyone else and it was questionable if US troops could drive them all the way to the St Lawrence before winter set in once again. If that was the case then it was likely that Canada could hold out for at least until the following summer.

Even so, the desperation of the situation had become apparent beyond Canada. Chamberlin and Wolseley, back in London, had been of the opinion that the downfall of Canada was inevitable for at least a year. They never said so publicly, not even in cabinet meetings but, their actions speak louder than words. Collectively, and very quietly, their staffs began drawing up plans that would keep the front active after large scale operations were no longer possible. They not only withheld this information from the Canadian Government but, did not bother to tell their man, Governor Minto, either.

It is questionable if Balfour and, by extension, the ailing Lord Salisbury, were made aware of these plans but, there is every reason to believe that they were, at a minimal, partially briefed. It is not reasonable to believe that Wolseley and Chamberlin, alone, could have diverted the resources that they did without at least some measure of disclosure to the cabinet. I believe this was mostly a case of, “ask me no questions and I will tell you no lies.” Still the men responsible for running Great Britain’s war effort had to know what was coming and had to know that a man like Wolseley, who had always held a personal interest in North America, would not stand idly by and just let it happen.

One has to consider the greater ramifications that the war cabinet was facing and this would go well beyond Canada. Great Britain’s imperial power rested completely on the stability of her Common Wealth treaty. Britain simply could not afford to govern such an empire without, at least, minimal consent and financial support from the very subjects they were ruling as imperial masters. The Commonwealth was their mechanism by which they did this and the agreement rested completely on Britain’s ability, namely that of the Royal Navy, to defend these lands. One could say that it was a very feudal arrangement. With this in mind it is understandable why the cabinet did not want to hear anything about the plan because it was essentially an admission that Britain could no longer fulfill their end of the treaty that held their empire together.

Still, in defense of the cabinet, the US Army had left them with very few choices in the matter and there were, also, other strategic considerations that had to be taken into account. One can argue that the entire affair was handled poorly (most of the blame here rides on the shoulders of Chamberlin) but, given the situation, the plan was sound enough. This is how a certain British Colonel, who also happened to be a prince, by the name of Arthur Windsor, commonly known as the Duke of Strathearn, was brought into the fold. As his name suggests, he was a son of Queen Victoria, he was a military man to the core and, most importantly, he had spent a great deal of time in Canada. Strathearn had worked closely with Minto during the years that the Canadian defense system was being built, so, it was reasoned he was the perfect man for the very delicate task that Woseley and Chamberlin had in mind. This was the task of briefing Minto on the plans for the capitulation of Canada.

Strathearn’s task was monumental, to say the least. We do have official records of his meetings with Woseley and it is very clear that Strathearn’s boss was expecting him to do more than just brief the Governor. Strathearn was not being given any official command, since Bullers and Minto would be left officially at their posts but, what came after the collapse of the front would be Strathearn’s responsibility alone. Apparently, it was Balfour’s wish that their two top officials, namely Minto and Bullers, be recalled once it was clear that Canada was lost. From that point forward, Strathearn would command the resistance which was to be more than just partisan warfare.

For over a year, the Royal Navy had been establishing a chain of small bases at the lower end of the Hudson Bay. They had been stockpiling supplies at these bases and while they were limited in their usefulness, only seasonably accessible, and surrounded by wilderness it was the perfect place to run a resistance movement. When the front could no longer be held, Strathearn was to lead the British troops that he could salvage from the front, through the wilderness, and establish himself at these bases. It would be very difficult for the US Army to reach him here and he would have a wide front in which to mount repeated raids against the enemy.

It was felt that this plan would accomplish the most critical need once the greater part of Canada was lost. There was no longer any hope of salvaging the agricultural importance of Canada. Most of the prime farm land was already being quickly overrun in the early summer of 1901. Canada’s industrial usefulness was already negated by the fact that most of her prime industrial centers were now falling under enemy artillery fire and, combined with the blockade, there was nothing left for her to contribute here. That left only one thing that Canada could contribute to the war effort and that was the act of tying down as much of the US Army as possible. If this was not accomplished then the US would be free to turn it’s entire might on the Confederate States and no one, in London, believed the Confederacy could hold that back.

This continued resistance was very important for more than just the obvious reasons. The effect that the loss of Canada would have on places like Australia and New Zealand would be devastating. There was already considerable opposition to the war beginning to bubble up but, again, this is also obvious. There would also be considerable problems with other nations that were not technically members of the Commonwealth but, might as well be. The two chief notables here are the Confederate States and the fledgling Empire of Japan. Both nations relied heavily on London in the pre-war years and, if they no longer saw Britain as a savior then, their support was no longer guaranteed. The consequences to British interests in North America and East Asia would, again, be devastating.

One has to wonder if Strathearn realized the gravity of the situation as he boarded a destroyer bound for Canada. The man literally had the fate of the world in his hands. Success in this most sensitive mission would mean that Britain very well could pull something out of this huge mess. Failure could literally mean the end of his empire. While these two possible conclusions were on the extreme ends of the spectrum the fact is that they were both reasonable possibilities that he had to consider. Unfortunately for history, and more so for Strathearn, we will never know what he thought. It is also the reason why we hear so little of the man today.

Duke Strathearn’s fast destroyer was spotted by a US Zeppelin not long after it departed it’s final coaling station in Greenland. Since the BB-39, designated the USN Tweed, did not attack the HMS Druid, her commander felt that he was safe enough. The Druid was one of the newest and fastest destroyers in the flotilla, not even a year past her first sea trials. Everyone felt confident she could outrun anything the Americans had blockading the seaway ahead of them. They had good intelligence on the disposition of enemy ships and the run for Montreal seemed a straight forward proposition. What no one on Druid, nor anyone else in the Royal Navy, at this time knew about was what the US Navy Airships were really up to.

It is unlikely that anyone aboard Druid ever knew what hit them. The fact that the St. Lawrence Seaway had multiple belts of mines, laid by both sides, was nothing new to anyone. The Royal Navy had mapped out the American belts and, naturally, had maps of their own. What they did not know, nor realize at the time, was that the Americans were now dropping mines from their Zeppelins. It was something very new as the US Navy was now trying to turn the submersible mine into a more offensive weapon by randomly seeding cleared channels from the air. These weapons also had a very new feature in that they were magnetic and would detonate if the metal hull of a warship even got close. This is somewhat ironic in this case since the hull of the Druid was made of wood.

It was largely irrelevant in this case. How the HMS Druid struck the mine will never be known. What we do know is that almost nothing was left of the ship and there were no survivors. Strathearn, along with Woseley and Chamberlin’s sensitive plans for the continued resistance of Canada, were gone in the blink of an eye. What is even more important is that the man who would have to deal with the fallout, Governor General Minto, had no idea that these plans even existed. When the critical breaking point was reached, Minto would already be completely disarmed and he did not even know it.