The Continental Divide

If you graduated from a high school in the United States, and you took a history class that progressed beyond the basics, then you are likely to have heard at least a mention of Henri Bourassa. You were probably told that he was a patriot of Quebec and that he had always favored independence. As much as it might draw fire from fellow historians, I do not believe there is much evidence of this and in Canada, where Bourassa is even mentioned less than in the United States, the story is quite different. The truth is that Bourassa was a radical for his time but, you have to put that into the context of his time. He seems to have been a man that was guided by certain ideals but, past that, he made some very common sense choices when confronted with actual issues. There have even been accusations that the man was a paid asset of the United States Government but, again, there seems to be no evidence of this. There were agitators in Quebec who were paid by the US government and they seem to have largely failed at their mission. Bourassa was educated in the United States but, his association with the US seems to have gone no further and, while all of the official papers concerning spies have not been found, this seems to be a case of deeds and not words. If you examine Bourassa’s actions there is plenty of evidence that he had as little use for the United States as he did for the British Empire.

Books could be written about the things that Bourassa was not and, in fact, many have. That does not really tell us what he actually thought. He was certainly a man that loved politics. He was elected mayor of his home town at the tender young age of twenty-two. He followed that by spending multiple terms in both the elected legislatures of Canada and Quebec. On more than one occasion, he said he was done with the pursuit of politics, only to run in the next election. This is all well known and documented but, it makes a profound statement about Bourassa’s intentions. He seemed more than content to work within the system even if sometimes he definitely opposed it.

Even before the war Bourassa had shown himself a radical. He had originally aligned with the liberals but eventually had a falling out with their nominal leader, Wilfrid Laurier, and ran for office as an independent from that day forward. The war only drove the supporters of these two factions even further apart but, in 1901, Laurier was the Prime Minister and Bourassa was no longer in office. On the surface this would seem to indicate that Laurier had won the battle for the heart and soul of their party but, when you take a closer look it was far more complicated than that and, indeed, this was quite an example of Canadian politics of the era, all in one microcosm.

Even before the Confederation, the Fenian Raids, the British garrisons, the transcontinental railroads, or even the war, Canada was a nation that was trying to find itself. Originally it was settled as a collection of French colonies and while these were not as extensive as their English counterparts to the south, several well established cities had sprung up. The colonies changed hands at the end of the Seven Years War and Great Britain virtually owned the continent, for several years, until the American Revolution. This forced Great Britain to rethink it’s policies in Quebec and Nova Scotia. Up till that point, if the local populations did not revolt then Britain virtually ignored the area. They made sure there would be no such uprising by winning over the catholic priests who were the defacto leaders of the region.

The newly independent Americans made this policy dangerous and the war had all but proved that. Britain began shipping in immigrants to settle deeper into the interior for fear that, eventually, the Americans would do so and claim this land instead. The British policy of containing the US directly conflicted with the American policy of expansion and the result was another war by 1812. This war ended in a draw that made both sides realize that the military option was going to get them nowhere and that they had more to gain in trade than conquest. By the 1840’s the US and Britain had worked out their territorial differences and even signed a treaty that both sides could live with. While the treaty was far from perfect, and there were still border conflicts, the treaty was largely a success until the American War of 1861.

When the Americans sponsored the Fenian Raids which were largely a retaliation for the British recognition of the Confederate States, this told the British government that a demilitarized Canada would no longer be practical. While we have examined the effects it had on Great Britain it is safe to say that they were nowhere near as profound as the impact on the Canadian people. Not only were they being asked to contribute to this defense, and per capita, far more than anyone in Britain would, they were also being asked to help pay for it as well.

This is the atmosphere that men like Henri Bourassa emerged from and, when taken into context one can understand his overall goals. He was not, so much fighting against the empire as he was the social ramifications of living in a country that’s entire existence was now dedicated to the pursuit of fighting a war. One can appreciate the irony of this in that before the American 61, Great Britain had gone out of it’s way to avoid the mistakes that led to the American Revolution but, the very existence of the American nation had now caused them to repeat those mistakes all over again. It was a vicious cycle that Britain found itself trapped in. This only fueled the arguments of men like Bourassa, of whom he was certainly the most prophetic.

While the Imperial policies had laid the groundwork for the emerging nation it was the war itself that would be the cement that made it very real. As noted before, most Canadians took the changes with a grain of salt and many could see the utility in these polices and had no argument that the United States was a genuine threat. None of them really believed that the war would ever come since, the good majority of them enjoyed amicable relations with their southern neighbors, despite world politics, much of which, might as well have been happening on another planet as far as they were concerned. This changed with the first US soldiers that crossed the Canadian border.

While it might appear to many, that Canada, with it’s long border and wide open spaces, is not very defendable against an attack from the south, this is something of an illusion. The fact is that most of those wide open spaces were wilderness at the time and there was no infrastructure to support the large armies that were required to mount offensive operations. The actual passable regions were few, narrow, and in area’s like Ontario and Quebec were actually easily defended with well trained and dedicated troops, something that Canada had. There was also the St Lawrence seaway which was wide and swift. If holding back the enemy proved impossible to the south of this line then, this body of water, which was practically a miniature ocean, was the most formidable of obstacles.

In 1901 the Anglo/Canadian forces had managed to hold the American advance well to the south of their final fall back position. It was critical that they do so because, not only did they receive critical imports from the seaway but, two of their most important manufacturing centers, Montreal and Quebec City, were sitting right on it. By 1901 the weakness in this defense had already shown itself but proved to be less of a weakness than the US Army had hoped for.

The Americans had managed to cross the river, in one place, across from Watertown, New York. They found that they could advance no further from this point, mainly due to the rugged terrain and the nearly impossible task of concentrating enough troops in the bridge head to break out, however, the serious effects of this crossing did not require going any further north. River traffic to the great lakes were effectively cut from the very start of the war. It was an expensive operation for the Americans but, one that proved worth the high cost in lives. It had serious ramifications on the front, further south.

The southern region of Ontario is a peninsular that is created by the great lakes. The geography makes the region extremely difficult to defend, yet, the Canadians managed and with very little help from the British Army. They did manage to slow the American advance to a crawl but, it was an advance none the less. By 1901 the city of Toronto, the major target in the region, had been surrounded and lain siege too but, was still in allied hands. The severing of river traffic from Montreal had serious consequences for the people who had decided to ride out the siege. The Canadians were still managing to get supplies in but, it was never enough to replace the consumption rate. Civilians were the first to feel the pinch.

It was at Toronto that the first division in the Imperial British command structure was seen. Governor General Minto saw the situation from a soldier’s view, one that was looking at the wider picture and he determined, rather quickly, that Toronto could not be defended and, by this time, was not even worth the cost. Oddly enough, and probably a first, General Buller was in complete agreement. This agreement from two former antagonists was a sign of things to come and nowhere near as surprising as another alliance that was forming. Henri Bourassa was the first to begin clamoring about the British plan to abandon Toronto. This surprised many in that the largely English speaking city was normally beyond Bourassa’s scope of concern. It was not nearly as surprising as when both General Otter and Prime Minister Laurier openly agreed with the man who had been a political thorn in their side for decades.

Minto has been often portrayed as being livid at the impudence of the ‘colonials’ in their open revolt to his decision. Even a light study of the records, that we have, prove this to be completely false. A lot of things can be said of Minto but, one thing is genuinely true, in that he did love the land he was ruling, even if he did so at the behest of a foreign nation. Judging by his writings, he did not see Otter or Laurier in the light of ‘colonial subjects.’ He viewed them more as comrades in arms. Their sudden revolt did not anger him, he was more puzzled and curious than anything else.

Minto’s actions to resolve this problem drew much fire in London, primarily from Joseph Chamberlin. Indeed, many have been critical of his resolution ever since and I think this unfair. I think Minto realized that he had no choice but to concede to the Canadian demands in this matter. He called Otter and Laurier into council with him. This was not so controversial due to the fact that it routinely happened. Where many drew the line with Minto was his decision to also meet with Bourassa, who was also present. This actually says more about Bourassa than it does Minto in that the francophone held no office at the time but, it is clear by his presence at these meetings that, he had now shown himself in command of a great deal of support inside of Canada. It was the kind of support that obviously transcended his traditional bases of power and even included elements of the English speaking community as well.

Future historians would portray Minto as bowing to the demands of usurpers but, again, this is unfair. The simple fact is that Minto’s power was completely based on the presence of British troops and in the area around Toronto, there were none. Any way that Minto went, he was going to have to deal with some rather nasty consequences and it was Laurier who recognized this and drove his points home. The loss of Toronto would be a serious blow to Canadian morale and for that reason alone, it had to be defended to the last. It was really the only point that was made in these meetings and, while Minto disagreed, his other options were far more devastating. He could not afford a show down with any of these men. He had to have known that he would loose and show the entire nation that the crown’s own representative was now a paper tiger.

One must keep in mind that this first sign of a crack between crown and colony, was before the British War Office decided to commit the bulk of their forces to the Balkans and not Canada. The planners at Pall Mall made their decision based on the most pragmatic of reasons and due to this they cannot really be faulted. What the military planners, working under Woseley, were not really aware of was the political impacts. They were military men, after all, and not particularly concerned with the realm of the political in the first place. They were just trying to win a war. There was no way they could have known the ramifications of this decision and in particular, from a commonwealth member that had shown itself to be loyal to a fault.

Unfortunately for Minto, he seems to have been all too aware of the ramifications and he said as much in multiple communications with the not only Chamberlin and the Foreign Office but, with Balfour and even the ailing Salisbury. Minto’s warnings were falling on deaf ears however. While it seems that both Chamberlin and Balfour were both aware of the impact, they seemed to lack the imagination to realize what could happen as a result. It is the kind of lack of vision that comes with not being on the ground and wearing jaded glasses that are colored with the tint of a by gone era. Unfortunately for the world, as far as national leaders went, they were far from alone.