Stand To Too On To

One phrase that was on everyone’s lips in the spring of 1899 was “On To…” followed by the capitals of their respective enemies. The war had come so late in the year that winter had left very little of a campaigning season for the armies of the world to get much done. Most people, including heads of state, seemed to accept these arguments from their generals. Spring would be the time to prove once and for all who was going to triumph in this war. This would all prove to be an illusion. Something the Generals seemed to be all to aware of.

A quick look at the casualty figures from the winter of 98-99 would show conclusively that the armies of the world had not given up on offensive operations. This was never more true than in Tennessee and Virginia. The US Army continued trying to push it’s position southward as the Confederates maintained their steady advance towards Washington DC. The real difference between the actions of winter and those of later in the year was both a combination of resources involved, and objectives. The winter fighting was mostly to prepare for the major attacks to come while the full scale offensives were aimed at achieving war winning objectives. They would not.

The armies of the world would mostly meet with disaster. The circumstances would be similar across the board and would not be better illustrated than in Tennessee. General Miles had been carefully hording his resources in Kentucky. He had been building up the largest troop concentrations in the history of North America, if not the world. His rail depots in Boling Green, Paducah, Lexington, and a host of other places were packed with mile high crates of supplies. The assaults on the Confederate defenses were meticulously planned by the division commanders. As the case would prove, this extensive planning, an exercise in micro management if there ever was one, would prove to be it’s undoing.

South of the lines the Confederates were well aware of where the attacks would come. Kentucky was ripe with Confederate sympathizers and spies. The defenses of western Tennessee hinged around Fort Bragg. The fort was not a true fort in the traditional sense. In peace time it was a major posting for the Confederate Army. The main post sat north east of Memphis just near the Kentucky border. It did have earthen works that surrounded the main post but, it’s true defenses lay in it’s block houses, rifle pits, minefields, and barbed wire that stretched all along the border and were several miles deep. All of these man made features had been long since overgrown by kudzu.

By March of 1899, the Confederate forces in the area had been built up and the soldiers who were defending the terrain had made good use of their time. The rifle pits had grown into connected lines of trenches. The block houses had been reinforced and expanded. The fields of wire that were, before the war, only in patches here and there, now stretched across the entire frontier. It had become a formidable defensive zone.

Miles was well aware of this but, he was obviously of the opinion that he could destroy most of it with artillery. He had apparently ignored the results of the Confederate bombardment of his own positions in Virginia. He, like most people who had personally witnessed it, had been awestruck by it’s intensity. Miles had not considered exactly how ineffective it had been. The artillery battle he would ignite in western Tennessee would make the one in northern Virginia seem small. The US guns, over eleven-hundred of them, would begin their bombardment at exactly 12:01 AM on the 16th of March, 1899. It would continue until the dawn on the 25th of March. If the Confederates had not been aware of the attack before this, they certainly were now. When the guns went silent at the crack of dawn, Johnny Kudzu would emerge from his bomb proofs and man his positions. Confederate defenses would be mostly intact.

US division commanders had put a great deal of thought into their advance. They had concentrated greatly on logistics. None of them actually said but, their actions proved that they truly believed the artillery would clear their way. When the first wave of US troops advanced from their start lines the individual soldiers were carrying all of their gear along with extra ammunition, excavation tools, and divisional supplies. The troops spread out in lines and began walking forward, burdened by a hundred plus pounds of gear. They proved to be easy targets for Confederate Maxim Guns.

This would prove to be just the first wave of the disaster. The Confederates had not been the only ones digging trenches. The front line trenches were connected to others that were further in the rear by a host of lines known as communications trenches. On the morning of the twenty-fifth, these particular trenchs were filled with the second and third waves of the assault. As they attempted to move forward they were met head on by waves of wounded being moved to the rear. The trenches were too thin for both groups and the result was the first great traffic jam of the modern era.

Meanwhile, the Confederate Offensive into western Maryland would encounter another kind of problem. General Alexander had given up on the idea of a direct assault on Washington DC. He maintained the pressure only to keep General Chaffee believing the main punch would fall on the city. The deception seems to have worked but, it did Alexander little good. On March 22nd, the leading elements of the ANV, probably the most elite troops on the continent, seized Winchester and managed to rip a sizeable hole in US line just west of Washington. Alexander had planned his assault well enough. He had troops in reserve that were detailed to exploit any breach in enemy lines. They would not reach the front before US reinforcements were able to plug the hole.

In Europe, the French showed little in the way of creativity in their renewed attacks on Metz and Strasbourg. At this point Boulanger was seriously, and ironically, considering a plan that was almost identical to that of his opponent, Von Schlieffen. He was considering a quick thrust through Belgium that he saw as allowing his troops to fall rapidly on a lightly defended Rhur. Once this heavily industrialized region fell the Germans would be hard pressed to continue their war effort. The plans were drawn up but, for the time being, Boulanger apparently changed his mind. Why he did this is anyone’s guess.

On the other side of Germany you had a case of two sides ramming into each other in offensives that started almost on the same day. Waldersee managed to get his offensive off first but the Russians were so nearly ready for their own that the two days made little difference. It his here, on the battlefields of Poland, Prussia, and Belorus, that we see the only example of war that is not dominated by trenches, stagnated lines, and massed artillery duels. Here we find two armies that are engaged in a real war of maneuver. Both sides would engage in a series of running battles and meeting engagements throughout the summer. By late July these would come to a head on a battlefield in Eastern Prussia where Waldersee would smash the majority of Russia’s best troops.

Despite the loss, of what amounted to Russia’s ability to wage serious offensive actions for some time to come, both sides would claim victory in the fighting. These were not hollow claims. The siege of Warsaw had been lifted and Russia was still firmly in control of the city. At the same time the Austrians had not faired as well as their German allies. Most of Silesia, including the city of Krakow, had been lost to the Russians. Both sides were now exhausted and in positions they could easily defend. All that the soldiers, on both sides of the lines, could do was dig in like their counterparts had elsewhere in the world.

By August it had become clear to the military and civilian leaders of the world that no quick and easy victory could be achieved. Everyone would desperately scramble for solutions to the problems they now faced. Changes were on the wind as every nation on earth prepared to devote every resource they had to win the war. The illusion of quick victory faded from memory. The real cost of this conflict was now becoming clear and it secretly horrified the heads of state.