Straws and Camel Backs

As noted before, President Root did not arrive back in Washington until the 19th. By this time the controversy over the Knox Telegram was already moving at full force and it was too late for damage control. Root found himself locked into a position, which would most likely lead to war, and he could not figure a way to extricate himself. He was dealing with a public, on both sides of the border, that thought full mobilization was already underway while the truth of the matter was that not a single reservist had yet to leave their homes.

Wheeler was in no better a position than his counterpart in Washington. It could be said that his was even worse due to the volatile nature of the Confederate Congress where shootings on it’s floor were not unheard of. Wheeler understood his military situation all too well. The United States was larger than the Confederacy and in order for his country to survive any possible war, it would have to get in the first strikes and make them hard. By this point, Wheeler had become convinced that this entire crisis, that was now boiling over in China, South Africa, Alaska, and even Europe was a direct result of the Cuban situation. He must have thought the US would not tolerate the sale of Cuba, to anyone but themselves, and as such had chosen war. Why shouldn’t Wheeler think that since it was his own position?

Wheeler’s real choice now, as he saw it, was how to appear to be the aggrieved party. He did not wish to make any moves that seemed overly provocative but, at the same time, he had to make sure his nation was not defenseless in the process. He ran these ideas by his key military people who were now practically camped out in his office. They nearly revolted at the suggestion of only a partial mobilization. 

General Alexander, the most effected by this proposal, since he commanded the troops facing occupied Virginia, raised the strongest protests. He pointed out that a partial mobilization, of the very kind that had been attempted earlier in the week by General Lee, would still result in a war. Alexander was no hawk by any means. He seldom spoke of politics but, the man had seen his share of conflict and, like so many others with similar experiences, was no fan of fighting. For this reason, when he spoke on the matter, everyone in the executive office saw it as a clear sign that they had truly crossed over the edge.

In the late hours of the 22cnd of September, Wheeler signed the document that put the Confederate States of America on a full war footing. He did not know it at the time but, similar arrangements were also well underway in Washington DC. General Nelson Miles, at Fort Lincoln, had already started the process way back on the 17th. His efforts became official only a few hours after Wheeler had started the process, for the Confederacy.

After President Root signed his own mobilization orders he promptly nodded to John Hay. The US Secretary of Sate had already prepared the appropriate telegrams and notes. It only took a phone call to get all but one of them sent. That last note, Hay wished to deliver himself because it’s recipient was located just down the street from the Executive Mansion. Hay called for a carriage and was standing in the lobby of the French Embassy only twenty minutes later. The French Ambassador was already prepared to meet with him so Hay did not have a long wait.

Theophile Delcasse was someone who was too useful to be dispensed with. He was articulate, educated, insightful, and well acquainted with both the diplomacy of his era and the quite often confusing nature of politics in Paris. Boulanger would never have found the man’s equal in the ranks of those that had not been run into exile. Delcasse was, in many ways, too good for his current President for life. Boulanger could have been better served by placing Delcasse in his cabinet but, thought it safer to send him to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Here Delcasse could put his talents to use in what was, most probably, France’s most important diplomatic posting.

Hay had sent telegrams to his man in Paris, and directly to the offices of President Boulanger. The past few weeks of lost messages and ill conceived telegrams had taken it’s toll. He also wished to personally size up his French allies. Hay later confided that not only had Delcasse surprised him but, worried him as well. Delcasse was less than enthusiastic at the prospects of war. Like most Frenchman of his time he understood that Germany was a threat to his nation, despised them, and wished to regain control of the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. Where Delcasse differed from his President was in the methods that had been chosen.

Delcasse would later write that he considered the, “entire state of affairs of the world as inexcusable.” He also noted that he detected Hay’s unease and stated, “do not worry Mister Secretary, you shall have your war and France will do it’s part.” There has been some contention that Delcasse did anything to ease Hay. Hay certainly did not feel that way nor did his account of the meeting record such a remark by Delcasse. It is clear that the biggest objection that Delcasse had at the time was that he felt it too soon. It is rather ironic in that Hay very well might have agreed with him on that point but neither of the men would bring it up.

What Hay did not know at the time, and Delcasse did, was the French leaders current state of mind. Boulanger, back in Paris, had been dismissing this entire crisis out of hand. He had remarked more than once, to his cabinet, that such incidents were to be expected. After all, Boulanger was the primary source for much of the current tension and he considered such incidents as side effects. There is no evidence that he believed any of this would result in war, at this time.

Boulanger was completely complicit with the American actions in South Africa. That was only natural since France was also taking an active part. In that region of the world, Boulanger, suffered from the exact same problem that Washington did. He had no timely and secure means with which to communicate with President Kruger. Boulanger, as was the case with Root, had no idea that the Boers were not only mobilized but, preparing to launch a full scale invasion of British territory. The date for this attack had already been set and, the irony is, that the British knew more about this than either Paris or Washington.

Lord Salisbury considered the skirmishes in South Africa to be the result of Boer, and by extension American, aggression. It is true that the British Cavalry initiated both engagements when they attempted to gather intelligence on the growing Boer Army but, they had done so for the purposes of self defense. Boulanger knew of this fighting because both battles, neither of which deserved the name, had made the newspapers. To him, and Root as well, they looked as an act of aggression by the British because neither leader was aware of Kruger’s plans.

As far as plans went, it should be obvious, that none of this fit into those devised by Boulanger. It is very common these days to dump the blame for the war entirely on him but, I hope I have adequately demonstrated that he was as lost as anyone at this point. It is possibly true that he was even more so since he was looking at the world as if he were controlling everything going on which, could not have been further from the truth.

What is strange is what did concern Boulanger. Germany issuing orders to call up troops did not but, that should have been expected. Both France and Germany routinely did this (even if they did not follow through with the orders) to test each others responses. The calls for war in North America did not, and very well should have, because Boulanger considered that an American problem and one that was clearly stated as such in his informal agreements with the US. If Boulanger had considered the ramifications, that any war the Confederacy fought with it’s northern neighbor would involve the British, is unknown. He gave us no indication that he even considered it.

What did bother Boulanger the most was the US relationship with Russia and the scraps of news he was getting about it’s current status. In some ways he was far more paranoid about his allies than the great big threat, sitting right in front of him, called Germany. While this might seem delusional you have to consider the political climate that Boulanger operated in. More often than not, his political allies, at home anyway, were the ones who presented the most danger as opposed to his enemies who were normally quite open with their intentions and, as a result, Boulanger knew where he stood with them. He apparently applied this thinking to his foreign policy as well.

That the US and Russia were allies was no secret to anyone. That France and Russia had their own agreements was not either. Why it was that the three nations, that would come to form the Triple Entente, had not bothered to unify their diplomacy will never be known. The best guess anyone could ever make is that they simply had not thought of it. You have to consider that both France and the US had become accustomed to their campaign of unofficial, back door, under the table diplomacy. This mode of thinking obviously infected the US State Department and the French Foreign Ministry. They compartmentalized everything and this apparently applied to dealings with mutual allies. 

For this reason, Boulanger had no idea what his two greatest allies were up to in the far east. What he did know was that US troops had moved on Tientsin. Despite the great strides made by the US military in the years leading up to the war, despite all of the hype that had come with it, despite all of the detailed reports that Boulanger received on the matter, he still thought of the United States in terms of a backwater agrarian country with no real hope of competing with Europe. When he was told that American troops seized the city of Tientsin, and began attacking the Taku Forts, he assumed that Russia was also involved. It was inconceivable to the late 19th century European mind that any American nation was capable of such a thing.

The same mindset was also true of Kaiser Wilhelm in Berlin. Unfortunately, Tsar Nicholas was learning the hard way that, the European perception, was not accurate. Boulanger ordered inquiries made with the Russian Ambassador. His Ambassador in St Petersburg made them directly to the Court of the Tsar. Nicholas replied with the truth. His forces were not engaged in operations in Asia and he had no knowledge of what the US was doing. This was the truth and so were the American responses to similar inquires, they were putting down a coup in Peking. Boulanger believed neither of his allies at this point. He was convinced something else was going on.

The most obvious answer was that the US and Russia were making some kind of power play in China and they had both decided to cut him out of the deal. It was not that Boulanger thought they had no right, after all he was making similar power grabs without notifying them. What did anger him was this was effecting French interests elsewhere as it was obvious that the British and Germans were responding. When the news arrived that the German Asiatic Squadron had seized Kiaochow, this only reinforced Boulanger’s opinion of the situation.

It took some time for Boulanger’s spies to confirm it but, it finally did appear that Germany and Russia were going into a very real, and full, mobilization. His only real question, now, revolved around who was at fault. If the situation was as it appeared, that the US and Russia had initiated hostilities in China then, France was not obligated to become involved. 

Boulanger’s decision here would be fateful. By this time much of the confusion, that had plagued the world capitals earlier in the month, was starting to clear. Diplomats and world leaders were starting to see the situation for what it was and get a handle on it. The one factor that everyone was looking at now was France. She had been inexplicably quiet during the entire affair and no one, outside of Boulanger’s cabinet, knew why. It made some suspicious and others relieved. French actions over the course of September 24th and 25th would decide the outcome. Would there be a few minor regional conflicts and a general cool down at the national frontiers? Would this erupt into the conflict that no one even thought was possible? It hall hinged on the actions, or inactions, of France. 

Many think that Boulanger jumped in with both feet at this point. After all, he had been wanting the war with Germany, for some time, and he would never get a better chance. One only need to look to Africa to see that this was not true. While Boulanger was setting his nation on a course for war he was not doing so in as reckless a manner as it first appears. Boulanger, for most of his life, was a military man and he did understand certain realities.

Africa, was seen in France, by both the governments of the Third Republic and the Boulanger Regime, as vital to the well being of their nation. It was here that France had access to raw materials, resources, and markets that were vital to her economy. Unfortunately, France was not the only power competing for domination. France had many claims in Africa that ranged from the Gulf of Somalia to the Ivory coast and all points in between. The French had established effective control over many of her colonies. She had shored up her claims to others but, the security of those colonies was far from perfect. Many of the regions in question were still disputed and the defense of some areas was dismal.

Boulanger had spent a great deal of time attempting to rectify this situation. There is no reason to think that he would have planned a war in Europe before he could assure his colonies were safe and in 1898 they were anything but. The most important factor in his effective control of the continent was the building of a trans-African railway. As stated before, the British were already working on one at the urging of Cecil Rhodes. Whoever could build one would not only control the trade but, have a decisive military advantage over the entire continent. 

At the time, Boulanger must have been feeling rather confident that he would finish his first despite the fact that no work had even begun. The British looked to be effectively blocked. In the south the Boers, with American guns and French money, would be unmovable. In the north the Mahdists were in control of the Sudan and had already defeated the British once before. It must have looked to Boulanger as if he had a clear shot at winning that particular race. There was only one step left for him to complete in order to assure his victory.

The primary difference between the British plans and that of the French, for their respective railways, was in direction. The British were attempting to build from Cairo to Capetown along a north/south axis. The French had taken to the idea of an east/west line from their colony at Libreville to their port city on the Indian ocean known as French Somalia (the present day Djibouti). As physics dictate, two such lines will cross. If one were to look at a map of Africa and trace the paths of the proposed lines then you will find that they meet in the Sudan, near a tiny village of little worth, called Fashoda.

Ultimately, the decision for war would not be made in Paris, Berlin, London, Washington, Richmond, or any national capital. The final straw would come from the backs of camels and horses that made up the cavalry units of the army of Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener. He had no idea that a war had just begun and that he had started it. The world had no idea that this conflict, that everyone held their breaths in anticipation of avoiding, had already started in a place, that before then, no one had even heard of or cared about.