Anatomy of a Crisis

The late 19th Century was thought of, by those who lived it, as a time when anything was possible. Every useful thing that could be invented already had been. Every comfort that was possible not only existed but, was possible to obtain by anyone who only worked and was patient. While it was true that there was a great deal of social strife, most of which was brought about by the very modernization that created these wonders, the sense of optimism of the time prevailed and most believed that even these problems could eventually be overcome by proper planning and time.

People knew about the wonders of their age but, few truly understood the full implications of the very technologies that they took for granted. Everyone knew about the telegraph. This speed of light communications system was now connected by a world wide system of underwater cables. It was now possible for an event to happen in Paris and people on the street of New York find out about it even before many in Paris knew. It was a fact that was accepted and known by all. What was not as well known was the fact that professional diplomats rarely, if ever, used the very wonders that their treaties made possible.

The diplomatic corps of 1898 was a very small community of professionals that all knew each other. Diplomacy was the profession of gentleman, accomplished in comfortable settings, and done by a set of civilized rules. Nationality meant very little here. They were all in the same line of work and all had long standing friendships even if their respective nations were rivals and even enemies. They were also a very conservative lot. Even if security issues had not been a factor one has to wonder if any of them thought that events could be so important as to require the need of a telegraph.

In essence the world had passed them by and while the diplomatic corps might not have been in any hurry, the events that they were supposed to manage, the very peace and stability they were supposed to ensure, no longer depended on the strength of their friendships with their opposite numbers. Speed of light communications had suddenly made it possible for national leaders to manage situations, on the opposite side of the globe, in real time. At least the national leaders seemed to think this and sometimes it was even true. Unfortunately, it was not always the case.

While the metropolitan centers of the world were now all linked to this rapid communications system, much of the rural area’s were not. Remote wildernesses still existed and communications in these places still only traveled at the speed of a man or horse. Given the varied terrain, this meant that news could take weeks or even months in getting out of an area as isolated at the Yukon Valley. No one had ever thought that a telegraph would really be needed there. After all, it was an odd sort of place for an international crisis to begin.

If it was an odd place it can equally be said that it was full of odd people. One such man was named Wyatt Earp. He was one of the many Americans that flooded into Alaska once gold had been discovered. Why Earp went there is really not clear. He very well could have been just another fortune seeker but, his past was an entirely different matter. Earp was not well known in 1898. Anonymity was as asset in his former line of work. He was what had been unofficially known in Kansas as a “Regulator.”

In the aftermath of the American 61, both sides had taken to raiding homesteads on the other side of the border. Most often these raids were blamed, by both sides, on their indigenous Native American populations. There is very little evidence now, and there really was none then, that Native Americans played any large scale role in the acts of banditry that plagued the border states. More than likely a great deal of the violence was caused by common thieves who now had an international border to hide behind. Even if this were the case neither the US nor CS governments did much to curtail the outlaws.

The name Regulator was most often used to describe someone who hunted bandits on your side of the border. In reality it seems that the men who hunted the enemy bandits were the same ones who would later cross the border and become bandits themselves. It is certain that Wyatt Earp was one of these men although it has never really been proven that he ever participated in a single raid inside the Confederacy. While I have no evidence, either, I believe it is quite naïve to think otherwise.

Exactly how he got to Alaska, and when he arrived is unknown. What he did there, before the events in question, is equally unknown. What we do know is that his raid on a Canadian logging town was no accident. We are relatively sure that he fully understood what side of the border he was on. Unfortunately, why he did it still remains a complete mystery.

The campaign that developed along the Alaskan frontier, to us now, looks almost as if it were planned that way. This would make it seem as if Earp was indeed an American Agent Provocateur. The school of thought that supports this belief is quite strong and equally divided as to the degree of his involvement with the US Secret Service. In truth, when looking back, there is almost no evidence to lead us to the conclusion that anyone could have controlled the course of events that would eventually play out. One can effectively argue that no one in Washington had to control anything there in order to accomplish their goals in Alaska. They simply had to stir the pot and it would boil over on it’s own.

Fortunately for us, we know a great deal about Earp’s Alaskan Campaign. This is the case because one of his young recruits, a fellow named Jack London, eventually had a falling out with Earp and returned to his native San Francisco where he wrote a series of novels that were thinly veiled accounts of his time with Earp. While there are many who take the London Novels as nothing more than pure fiction, I am in the camp that believes there is a wealth of knowledge to be gained by his accounts. There is no reason to believe that London embellished anything since he and Earp did not exactly part on the best of terms. Neither could you exactly describe London as a fellow who was some kind of radical patriot. His political activities after the war prove just the opposite.

At any rate, London was present for the raid in late August of 1898. This much we know for certain. Unfortunately, the actual date of the attack is lost. The surviving raiders are not even in agreement on the actual date. None of the Canadian loggers survived to tell the tale. We only know for certain that the raid was first reported to a Royal Canadian Mounted Police Station on September 11th. News of the attack reached England, and the desk Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of the Colonies, in the early morning hours of the 12th, Greenwich Mean Time.

While it is impossible to believe that an action in the far reaches of North America could have been coordinated with an action of equal provocation in the southern most reaches of Africa, the Salisbury Cabinet considered this a possibility. It seems ludicrous now but one has to consider what they knew. The telegram that Chamberlain received did not specify details, only that there had been an attack. At the time they were completely unaware that the Earp raid had occurred weeks prior to it’s discovery. The crisis they were dealing with in South Africa actually happened after the Earp Raid but, in the offices at White Hall it appeared that the attack was a retaliation for it.

The South African crisis began in the equally remote setting of what we know today as Mozambique. At the time the region nominally fell under the authority of the Portuguese Government. The reality was somewhat different in that the colony was practically autonomous of Lisbon in all but name. 

The Americans and French had followed through on their promises to President Kruger of the Transvaal. Their major problem was that neither of the Boer Republics had any coastline and the only good ports in the region were all under the control of the British.

Just before the Boulanger coup of 89, the French had acquired control of the Island Kingdom of Madagascar. It sat directly off the coast of Mozambique and made the perfect staging area for smuggling guns into the heart of South Africa. They only had to be moved across the wilderness of Mozambique and the local authorities were more than happy to oblige for the right price. The only problem with officials who can be bought is that they will often sell to anyone with cash. This was exactly what happened and slowly word of the arms shipments began to leak out.

Cecil Rhodes, the prominent British Banker and leading English citizen in South Africa, had not only heard the rumors but, he had managed to purchase some of the American arms through agents of his. He knew the Boer’s were being heavily armed and he had little trouble convincing the new colonial official in Capetown, Sir Alfred Milner, that something needed to be done about it.

It would seem now that Milner’s response to the crisis had more to do with personal concerns than anything else. While Milner was back in London he had made the acquaintance of a certain young lady that just happened to be married. Her title was Lady Edward and her husband was Edward Cecil, the son of the now Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury. Milner took more than an active interest in Lady Edward and soon they were a common sight together at afternoon picnics and bicycle rides.

By 1898 they were both in Capetown, but, unfortunately so was her husband. Reports from people who personally knew the couple (and their affair was hardly a secret to anyone except Edward) state that Lady Edward was more for the idea of a hard military response than was Milner. Since her husband was a soldier it would mean he would be away and she would get to spend more time with her lover. If Milner realized, or even cared about this, is open to debate. We only know for certain that he decided Kruger would have to be handled in such a fashion that would make him think twice about being so bold in the future.

Milner called for a meeting with both Kruger and Martinus Steyn, the president of the Orange Free State. Steyn had been far less enthused about the idea of war with the British while Kruger was of the opinion that the Jameson Raid had really been a declaration of war and that the Boer Republics were just living on the borrowed time of an unofficial truce. The meeting at Bloemfontein, what little of it their was, changed Steyn’s mind. After a 45 minute scolding, by Milner, Steyn left the train car as a true believer of everything that Kruger had been trying to convince him of for the last two years.

Milner had not come to talk. He addressed both men with what was most certainly a prepared speech, afforded them no opportunity to reply, and then dismissed them as if they were children at his beck and call. This was not Milner’s biggest mistake however. He had not bothered to inform Chamberlain prior to his actions. This was on August the 22cnd and Milner had left the meeting thinking that he had scored a great victory for his empire. He was completely perplexed when, on September 1st, Leander Jameson was hauled out of his jail cell and sentenced to death by a Pretoria Court.

This was an act without precedence and one that the British could hardly stand for. One of the provisions that was agreed upon at the end of the First Boer War was that British citizens in the free republics would be subject to British law. When Jameson had not been handed over for trial, two years earlier, London had been content to play a waiting game, confident in the fact that the Boers could not afford to offend the Empire too greatly. Milner had been dispatched to Capetown to handle the delicate situation and now it appeared as if he had managed to bring about the very thing he had been ordered to avoid.

Fortunately for Milner’s career, Chamberlain had a very fuzzy picture of what was going on. He first learned of the Jameson verdict by telegraph dispatches that arrived well in advance of Milner’s written report concerning the meeting of August 22cnd. All the while, Pall Mall, the headquarters of the British Army, received a separate report directly from Cecil Rhodes concerning the American arms shipments to the Boer Republics. Rhodes report was quite alarmist in nature and included many things that he did not really know for certain but, no one at Pall Mall had any way to know that most of Rhodes report was pure rumor and speculation. (In truth, Rhodes imagination came nowhere near the reality and he grossly underestimated the numbers of arms in Boer hands. He also completely missed the American advisors in the Transvaal which by this time were there in force.)

To Chamberlain, in those early weeks of September, the events that began to take shape in his mind were that Kruger ordered Jameson’s execution, hence violating his treaty with Britain, Milner delivered an ultimatum, and that somehow the Americans had decided to get involved. This was quite possibly in response to British moves in the Sudan which were, at the time, being loudly protested by both the French and US governments. The Cabinet was called back into session after the final report arrived (Milner’s notes on his meeting with Kruger and Steyn) and on September the 6th it was decided that a full ultimatum to Kruger would have to be issued.

Unfortunately, the Cabinet had already decided on a course of action on the 2nd of September when the Rhodes report was personally delivered by none other than the Chief of Staff, General Wolseley. It had never been any secret that Wolseley had little love for the United States since he had many personal friends that were Confederates. On September the 3rd a very vague warning was hand delivered to the US Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge.

Lodge was not aware of any arms shipments to the Boers and the note he was handed did nothing to enlighten him. It made no mention of any such shipments nor did it even specify where in Africa that Great Britain would not tolerate continued interference. Lodge assumed that the British were responding to American protests over General Kitchener’s invasion of the Sudan and he did nothing to mark the note as a priority since such a response was to be expected. The note would not arrive in Washington until the end of September. Unfortunately, the Salisbury Government had no idea that President Root had not received the warning when Chamberlain was informed of the Earp raid.

It is quite possible that this series of blunders and misunderstandings could have been resolved. They were certainly not unheard of in the diplomatic community and it was a primary reason why these men were so cautious about moving quickly. If the diplomats had been the only ones with any concern in the outcome of events then peace may have likely prevailed. This was no longer the case and the diplomats failed to grasp this. All the while, yet another crisis was starting to brew in an entirely different area of the world.

As I noted earlier, the Germans found themselves shut out in the cold after the crushing defeat suffered by China at the hands of the Japanese. The German Asiatic squadron was now without a home. It was already outgunned by most of the other European powers in the region and with the loss of it’s primary coaling base, at Port Arthur, it was desperately in need of another. The prevailing view in the German Navy was to take another base from the Chinese, by force if necessary. The operational commander of the squadron, Rear Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, had argued for just such an action. He even knew what port Germany could secure. As it was, he was having to sail all the way to Manila to acquire fuel and not only did this greatly reduce his operational capability but, the Spanish were charging outlandish sums for their services.

Tirpitz had been repeatedly rebuffed. He was denied his requests by orders that came directly from the Kaiser. Wilhelm was too preoccupied with the constant posturing of French President Boulanger. It is quite possible that Wilhelm may have believed that an offensive action in China would be just the spark that Boulanger was looking for. The French had Germany greatly out gunned in the far east and any confrontation over China would quickly escalate into a war at home since Germany would have little choice but to attack France if they wanted to win.

There were many in the German military who wanted just such a war even if their Emperor was reluctant. What the leading German soldiers of the time could not agree on was how to fight it. This very problem, a developing feud between Wilhelm’s two most talented commanders, General Alfred von Waldersee and General Alfred von Schlieffen, was probably the very reason he was reluctant.

Waldersee initially enjoyed the advantage in that he and Wilhelm had been personal friends since before Wilhelm was the Emperor. This changed dramatically in 96 when the two men had a falling out. Waldersee found himself off the General Staff and with a field command near Hanover. Schlieffen took his place and quickly put the general staff to work on his plans for a lightening campaign to defeat France. In theory, the Germans could finish that campaign before the Russians could mobilize and come to their aid. At that point Germany could either defeat the Russians with the full might of their military or, negotiate since Russia would be going into the conflict without benefit of France as an ally.

The plan sounded good in theory but, in practicality, even Wilhelm could see the problems with some of the details. Schlieffen insisted on a quick march across neutral Belgium and in reality his entire plan hinged on this. Wilhelm could see the merits but, his foreign secretary, Bernhard von Bulow, was quick to point out the political realities. The British would never tolerate a violation of Belgium neutrality. Germany could fight France and even possibly take on Russia as well but, Great Britain would have to remain, at worst, neutral or optimally be an ally against France. Wilhelm’s plans for a huge navy, based on the British model, were still just a dream and Britain could easily strangle Germany to death without ever having to land a single soldier on the continent. 

Schlieffen would not let it go so ultimately it was Schlieffen who went. Waldersee was back at the General Staff by August of 98 and Schlieffen was posted to V Corps, for the time being, where his service would later be crucial. The return of Waldersee was hailed by some and detested by many. Whatever else that can be said of him, the man definitely left a lasting impression that was felt by all who knew him. He was considered rash, reactionary, and quite zealously narrow. Your opinion of him would have depended on what you thought of these qualities. 

With that in mind, it was a wonder to many that he returned to the General Staff with what could only be described as a clarity of vision. In truth, Waldersee’s almost magical knowledge of the future was based on accurate intelligence reports that he had received while being posted in Altona. It was later disclosed that his spy was a French officer named Ferdinand Esterhazy, who after years of gambling, had squandered his family’s wealth and eventually became a paid spy. Esterhazy was not a distinguished soldier but, he was very good at playing the role. He had fostered a number of important relationships in the French military and used this to gather information that he in turn sold to the German Military Attaché in Paris. Waldersee had apparently learned of this leak sometime in 94 and diverted the reports to his headquarters where he used the knowledge to get back in the good graces of Wilhelm. 

Waldersee’s return to the general staff allowed him access to other intelligence and as a result he was able to piece together what was going on. It was a fortunate chain of events for Germany because Waldersee was probably the only man on the planet that could see the entire strategic picture for what it was. War was inevitable and had been for some time. France was not just harboring some vague urge of revenge against Germany, they were actively pursuing plans to achieve it. They had willing accomplices in the Americans and it was well known that the United States was deeply involved with the Russians. All of this spelled out bad news for Germany.

At first, Waldersee could convince no one of this. Wilhelm was quite prepared to send him packing once more. Von Bulow scoffed at the notion. Why this was the case is not known, however, it is safe to say, that both men were so fixated on France that they were ignoring the larger picture. To use a modern euphemism, they were thinking inside the box. Von Bulow was especially reluctant to accept this view since he was quite confident in his diplomatic skills and the thought that such a conspiracy, of this scope and size, could possibly ever escape his attention for so long was ludicrous.

Waldersee remained undeterred and set up meetings with those he saw as soon to be allies. Most prominent of these was the Confederate Military Attaché to Germany, Brigadier General Henry Dickerson McDaniel. The Brigadier found that he was quite often scoffed at by the aristocratic German Officer Corps due to his unremarkable beginnings. McDaniel was a career maverick who had only joined the ranks of the officer corps after he took charge of his regiment when all of it’s officers were killed at Gettysburg. For this reason he was surprised that Waldersee wanted to see him personally but, McDaniel eagerly accepted. Waldersee was very guarded about what he told the Confederate General but it was enough to raise some hackles and McDaniel wasted no time in reporting this to Richmond.

Then on August 29th the United States’ highly touted, but untested, ‘Great White Fleet’ anchored at Port Arthur in China. They also landed troops but, this brigade of Marines, some artillery, and a regiment of cavalry under the command of the flamboyant (and widely photographed) Colonel George Armstrong Custer was pale in comparison to the Army of Russian Infantry that had already occupied the city. The combination of sea power with the backing of a land army was of a scope that had yet to be seen in Asia and it represented a definitive threat to the other European powers should it go unchecked.

Since Waldersee was already aware that the United States and France were partners, he saw the new threat in China in a very ominous way and realized it meant Russian complicity. Even Wilhelm could no longer deny that something was amiss. On the very day that the British Cabinet issued it’s warning to the American Ambassador in London, Wilhelm issued secret orders to Rear Admiral Tirpitz in the Pacific. Neither Wilhelm nor Salisbury were aware of the others actions. Wilhelm commanded Tirpitz to seize the Chinese port city of Kaiochow and secure it for the safety of his squadron and as a base of operations for war should that become necessary.

As with the British warning to the Americans, once again, communications difficulties would come into play. At the time the order was issued in Berlin, the East Asian Squadron was actually deployed near the coast of Korea, monitoring activities of the newly arrived US fleet. The order was sent, via wire to Manila, on the only semi secure line the Germans had at the time and was entrusted to the German consulate there. What the Germans were unaware of was that the Spanish, who owned Manila, had managed to partially break the German diplomatic code, and combined with a sudden flurry of German activity, became alerted to the possibility of a military action in the works. Madrid knew about the coming German offensive before even Tirpitz did. The Spanish were not alone.

Meanwhile, in Richmond, President Joe Wheeler was still trying to consolidate his government and seemed to be hopelessly diverted by the discussions with the United States that were taking place in Langley, Virginia. In truth, he was more preoccupied with the secret negotiations that were currently going on in Rome, Italy. Wheeler had inherited these discussions from the Hampton administration and they were yet another earnest attempt at purchasing the island of Cuba. The negotiations had been stalled for some time since the Spanish were holding a high price over the Confederates head and wanted to sell all of their possessions as a package deal.

It was no secret to the Confederates that Spain was also negotiating with both the United States and Germany. Wheeler had instructed his man on the scene, in Langley, the Atlanta attorney and law professor Woodrow Wilson, to broach the subject with the chief US negotiator, Theodore Roosevelt. Wilson had long since come to suspect that Roosevelt was intentionally being kept in the dark by Root. When Roosevelt denied that any such negotiations were taking place, Wilson had assumed that Roosevelt was telling the truth as he knew it. The only problem here was that the denial was not all that Roosevelt had said. Off the record, Roosevelt had issued a stern warning to the Confederacy that Cuba was not to be touched. President Wheeler had yet to make up his mind if this was US policy or just the energetic Roosevelt’s personal opinion.

It was for these reasons that when McDaniel’s warning from Waldersee finally made it to Wheeler’s desk, the Confederate President could only see it as an attempt by Germany to somehow sabotage the negotiations over Cuba so that they could make the purchase. Wheeler was slowly forming the opinion (based on the US and German attitudes) that the Confederacy was no longer being considered as a serious competitor for Cuba. At best the Spanish were using the CSA to shore up the price for the two richer nations to fight over.  

With this in mind he dismissed the German warning out of hand but, two other bits of information did concern him. One came from the most unlikely of sources, a transplanted Scotsman who ran a collection of British owned cattle interests in Texas, by the name of, Murdo MacKenzie. The Confederate Cattle and Farmers Association and Trust not only owned ranches in Texas and Florida but, had extensive holdings in Cape Colony. This is why Murdo had spent the better part of June and July in South Africa. Some of this time was in the company of his friend and business associate, Cecil Rhodes. MacKenzie was present when Rhodes first saw the US rifles that his agents had purchased for him in Pretoria. At the time Murdo thought little of it.

By the 3rd of September, Murdo was visiting his offices in Richmond. He attended a political fund raising dinner that night and found himself in the company of a Confederate Senator from Georgia, James B Gordon. Gordon was a staunch Home Party member (one of the few who had no been swept out of office in the 97 elections) but, had a personal relationship with Wheeler. Unlike Hampton, Gordon was not prone to letting business and personal matters mix, despite his strong political views. This meant that Gordon had access to Wheeler and the two met at the Executive Mansion late in the night of September 5th. It was already the 6th in London and this was the day that the British Cabinet issued it’s ultimatum to President Kruger.

The second bit of information, that Wheeler received, came officially from the British. Lord Salisbury had not bothered to inform the Confederates of any of the events unfolding in South Africa since he did not think they really needed to know. Wheeler had only heard about the Jameson Verdict by the same way anyone else might, the newspapers. He heard about the British ultimatum to Kruger while he was talking with his friend John Gordon. This did not even arrive via the British but from the Confederate Embassy in London who only learned of it through unofficial means. 

It was only as an afterthought that Lord Salisbury bothered to inform Wheeler of the warning delivered to Ambassador Lodge on the 1st. To Salisbury’s credit he did order the Confederates informed on the same night that the warning was delivered, however, this went through official channels and the sluggish nature of the bureaucracy meant that Wheeler would not actually receive the communiqué until the day of the 6th. 

There was also the problem that the warning, to the United States, was actually written by Chamberlain and, Salisbury had not read the text. Chamberlain had, as I said earlier, remained vague while Salisbury was very specific in his communications with Wheeler. The Salisbury Note not only seemed to confirm the information that Wheeler already had but, it also left him angry that the British had not informed him earlier. At this point, Wheeler then decided he could no longer depend on London for information.

The very next day Wheeler called in his chief military advisors. Most notable at the meeting were the current commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, E. Porter Alexander, and Secretary of the Confederate Navy James Bulloch. In the years since Bulloch had consolidated his power over the Navy, he had also become the unofficial spy master for the Confederacy. His views along with those of Alexander’s were given considerable weight by Wheeler.

The most concerning report came from the Confederate Cruiser, CSS Savannah, that had just recently put in for re-coaling in Hong Kong. She had just arrived from a routine patrol in the Philippines where she stopped over in Manila for a courtesy call. Her Captain, Richmond Pearson Hobson, had observed the unusual flurry of Naval activity. He had been mindful enough to make some discreet inquiries and quickly discovered the Germans were behind these preparations. Hobson realized the possible implications and cut his patrol short. He reported his findings to the Confederate Consulate almost as soon as he arrived in Hong Kong. A day later it was being called to the attention of Wheeler, by Bulloch.

Wheeler chose to interpret this as nothing less than the Germans making Manila their new permanent base of operations in the pacific. The implication of this was that Spain had finalized a sale and that meant Cuba very well might be on the verge of changing hands as well. What served to further confuse the matter was the current activities of the United States. In some ways you could even say it was the lack of activity that was the most disturbing to Wheeler.

The movement of the US fleet to China had caused some concern in Richmond but it had been viewed mostly as a British problem. Now Wheeler was starting to wonder if the US move was aimed at the Germans instead. That would certainly explain the McDaniel Note from Waldersee and it meant that the United States and Germany were on the verge of war over the Philippines. Wheeler could not ignore the possibility that this war could also easily decide the fate of Cuba as well. That was a matter that the Confederacy would have to go to war over.

There was also the concern that Washington had not reacted in any way to the warning they were given by Salisbury. At the time, Wheeler could not know that President Root had not received it yet and, had no idea that the warning (due to it’s vague nature) would have been of little concern even if he had. Wheeler chose to look at this as if the United States was simply ignoring Britain, quite possibly counting on a crisis in South Africa, facilitated by those who now appeared to be US Allies, to render the British unable to respond to a war in the Pacific.

At this point Wheeler saw that he was faced with some hard choices. His options were limited but, he still chose to at least try the one last peaceful measure at his disposal. He instructed his Secretary of State, Stephen D. Lee to wire their negotiator in Rome and make one last firm offer on Cuba. The price would not be up for negotiation, it would be what the Confederacy could afford, and that if the offer was not accepted then the CSA would reserve the right to use any measures it saw fit to prevent Cuba from falling into hostile hands. 

This note was delivered to the Spanish negotiation team on the 8th. The next few days must have been very hard ones for Wheeler. Nobody in his inner circle truly believed the Spanish would accept the offer. Some, including Bulloch, even feared that Spain would take the harsh language as an outright threat. That was why on September the 12th, the day London found out about the Earp Raid, Wheeler was as shocked as anyone that Spain had accepted.